The Perception of U.S. Threat and Its Impact on the Russia–Iran Alignment, 2002–2023

Peyman Amiri

doi:10.47814/ijssrr.v9i2.3161

Peyman Amiri Vilnius University, Lithuania

DOI: https://doi.org/10.47814/ijssrr.v9i2.3161

Keywords: Russia; Iran; threat perception; Balance of Threat; NATO; Baltic security

Abstract

This article analyses the evolution of Russia–Iran relations from 2002 to 2023, arguing that strategic convergence has been driven primarily by shared perceptions of U.S. threat rather than short-term tactical interests. Drawing on Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory and qualitative process tracing, it examines how U.S. military interventions, NATO enlargement, and coercive sanctions reshaped Iranian and Russian threat assessments. Three turning points—the 2003 Iraq War, the 2015 joint intervention in Syria, and the 2018 collapse of the JCPOA—accelerated alignment. The article shows that the 2022 war in Ukraine transformed this alignment into a strategically consequential partnership with direct implications for NATO deterrence and Baltic security.

References

This article analyses the evolution of Russia–Iran relations from 2002 to 2023, arguing that strategic convergence has been driven primarily by shared perceptions of U.S. threat rather than short-term tactical interests. Drawing on Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory and qualitative process tracing, it examines how U.S. military interventions, NATO enlargement, and coercive sanctions reshaped Iranian and Russian threat assessments. Three turning points—the 2003 Iraq War, the 2015 joint intervention in Syria, and the 2018 collapse of the JCPOA—accelerated alignment. The article shows that the 2022 war in Ukraine transformed this alignment into a strategically consequential partnership with direct implications for NATO deterrence and Baltic security.