Representation and the Internal World: A Perspective from Evolutionary Mind
From the perspective of phenomenology and phylogenetic evolution, this manuscript reports a critical study of the core position of representation in the mind. The development of mind can be divided into three stages: body, unconsciousness, and consciousness. In this complex evolutionary process, the organism gradually has a relatively independent internal world, and it can use representation to simulate the interaction between itself and the world. Accordingly, its ways to deal with the world’s “challenges” have become more flexible and diverse. In addition, the internal world can go beyond the simple “replication” and “simulation” to some extent, and construct people or things unlike the real world (even nonexistent people or things). On one hand, it provides soil for human creative activities; on the other hand, it provides a hotbed for human beings to get out of the real world and immerse themselves in various fantasies. Human beings live in the world under the “resulting force” of the internal loop and the external loop.
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