Parliamentary Threshold Policy as an Attempt to Reduce the Number of Political Parties in the Indonesian Parliament

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the parliamentary threshold policy as an effort to reduce the number of political parties in parliament in Indonesia. The urgency of this research appears to be that up to now there are still pros and cons and even problems in implementing the parliamentary threshold, considering that this policy will make it difficult for the president as head of state and government to obtain stable support from the legislature and make policies. The approach method in this research is normative juridical, with descriptive analysis specifications. The data used is secondary data with qualitative data analysis. The results of the research show that the Parliamentary Threshold Policy in the Indonesian constitutional system was only implemented in the 2009 election. In the 2009 election, the Parliamentary Threshold policy was regulated by Article 202 paragraph (1) of Law Number 10 in 2008, Political Parties Contesting in the Election had to meet a threshold of at least 2,5% of the number of valid votes nationally to be included in determining DPR seats. The 2014 elections are regulated by Article 208 paragraph (1) of Law Number 8 of 2012 and confirmed by Constitutional Court Decision No. 52/PUU-X/2012, it rose to 3.5%, and in the 2019 elections are regulated by Article 414 paragraph (1) of Law Number 7 in 2017, it rose again to 4%. The Parliamentary Threshold policy is not effective enough in simplifying the party system in Indonesia. The results of the 1999 DPR Election which did not implement a Parliamentary Threshold at all, instead resulted in a simple multiparty system, while the 2009 Election, 2014 Election, and 2019 Election each installed a Parliamentary Threshold for DPR Elections of 2.5%, 3.5%, and 4%, resulting in an extreme multiparty system.