The Prohibition of Torture: From Absolute Prohibition to Conditional Permissibility in Light of Normative Ethical Theories

Abstract

Torture, as an inhuman act, involves inflicting severe physical and psychological pain and suffering on an individual by state agents for the purpose of obtaining vital information, imposing punishment, or securing a confession. Despite its absolute prohibition in international instruments, in special circumstances such as the "ticking time bomb hypothesis," justifications are presented for the use of torture in the interest of national security or the preservation of social order. The present article, using a descriptive-analytical approach, examines the view of normative ethical systems on the prohibition of torture in exceptional circumstances. The research findings show that for followers of virtue ethics and deontological ethics, there is no moral justification for torture, even in emergency situations. In contrast, proponents of utilitarian ethics believe that torture can be used exceptionally, as the benefits gained from it outweigh the victim's pain. However, this argument is criticized and leads to the conclusion that accepting torture is in no way logical. Torture is not only impermissible, but its justification can lead to serious abuses.