Tudeh Party and North Oil Score

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http://dx.doi.org/10.47814/ijssrr.v4i3.93

Abstract

The Soviet Union and before that, Russia as one of the most powerful neighbors of Iran in history, despite its abundance of oil resources always looked at Iran's oil resources for specific purposes. In examining the impact of oil on the relations between the two countries of Iran and Russia, it turns out that they were trying to reach the Iranian oil resources in some cases, one in 1299/1921 and the other in 1920/1941. At the time of Iran's occupation of the Second World War, the Russians, though at every turn did not succeed in their goals, during the occupation of Iran in September 1941 by the Allies they used all the necessary tools. For example, they used the Tudeh Party, the first and most organized Leftist party in Iran, to achieve its oil targets. At this stage, the Russian Foreign Ministry Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergey Kavtaradze came to Iran and formally requested for a license to exploit North Oil. The Tudeh Party, while previously opposed to any transfer of privilege to foreigners, when the Soviet Union- their spiritual and co-professional supporters came out, by providing the Balance Scheme they granted the southern oil share to the British and the North Sea's privilege to the Soviet Union. Because the American companies were set to exploit the oil scorecard in northern Iran, immediately the Soviet Union entered the scene and the Tudeh party also met with them. This oil demand was rejected by the Iranian parliament and the Iranian government opposed any new privilege because of the prevalence of war conditions in the world. In this context, the efforts of the Tudeh Party to satisfy the Iranian government and parliament in order to agree with the Soviet demand for oil in their own way can be considered.

Keywords: North Oil; Tudeh Party; Soviet Union; Iran; United States

Introduction

One of the issues that was of great importance in Iran's relations with Soviet in the Pahlavi era was the issue of "North Oil" and the companion of the "Tudeh Party of Iran" with the influence of the Soviet Union in this country. The issue of North Oil was one of the most important issues in the relations between Iran and the Soviet Union at the time of 1920 and 1941. At both levels, close attention to Iran's third power to reduce the influence of Russia and Britain from Iran has been considered. However, this matter has not been equally important in these two times. In the first period, the issue of proximity to the third power was more pronounced, but during the second time (1941), the Iranian occupation by the Allies and the attempt by Iran to give the North oil concession to American companies would inevitably bring the Soviet Union into a game of concessions from Iran in the field of North Oil. The Russians,
however, considered themselves unnecessarily in reserve, but when they came to American companies, they quickly entered into action. Meanwhile, the occupation of Iran in the Second World War and the presence of the Soviet forces in Iran and the support of the Left parties, in particular the Tudeh Party of the Soviet demand for oil brought this issue to a new stage. The Tudeh Party, which initially opposed the transfer of any oil concession, but it retreated from the previous positions against the Soviet demand for oil and announced that the allocation of the North Oil Score to the Soviet Union is justified, because the South Oil Score is available to the British. For the sake of equality of opportunity or, in their own words, a balance, it is better to leave the North Oil Score to the Soviet Union. Although the Tudeh Party was not the first left party or with a communist tendency in Iran, but among the left-wing parties in Iran It had a better organization and had more durability than other parties in Iran. The Russians use this instrument together with media support (Tudeh press), military presence in Iran and some of its affiliated representatives in the time National Assembly, especially the 14th parliament, etc., as levers to achieve their goals in Iran. The present article describes the Soviet demand for oil and its internal and external conflicts that have been effective in relations between the two countries of Iran and the Soviet Union at different times. Although the demand for the North Sea oil quota granted by the Soviet Union was rejected by the Iranian government and parliament, but the study of this issue will have enlightenment on the goals of both sides (Iran and Soviet Union).

**The Emergence of Left and Marxist Parties in Iran**

The emergence of left-wing parties in Iran was not at once, but some events and conditions have been effective to create such parties and attitudes in Iran over the time. Perhaps the Tudeh Party is considered the strongest and most coherent left-wing political party formed on the basis of the party's program and hierarchy in Iran. At the same time, they were not the first left-wing party in Iran, but before them, there were communist and socialist parties in Iran. Later, some people from these groups joined the Tudeh Party. The parties formed with communist and socialist attitudes in Iran include:

1. **Justice Party of Iran:** Early in the First World War, a small group of workers, headed by Asadollah Ghaflarzadeh and Ahmed Amiraf was created. This group, which called itself the party, had not yet reached the level of the organization or the party, but with the victory of the Russian Revolution, they formed the first working party of Iran. They called it the "Justice Party of Iran" and centered the party at the Iranian Tamadon School located in the Sabounchi neighborhood of Baku "(Pishevari, 1970: 15-17).

2. **Communist Party of Iran:** When the Justice Party of Iran was integrated into the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leaders and members of the Justice Party accepted the membership of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, but some were also ready for deployment to Iran to continue their work. The first congress of the Communist Party of Iran was formed in Anzali from 23 June 1920 (Ravassanipour, 1989: 134). Members of the Communist Party of Iran can be referring to Kamran Aghazadeh, Seyyed Ja'far Pishevari, Behran Aqayof, Ali Khanov and Heiydar Amoougli. Of course, there is not a lot of information about the members of the Communist Party and their number and in most references; members and fans are mentioned together. It seems that its official members in Iran do not train many people (Nazeri, 2003: 20). In 1921, when Heiydar Amoougli was at the head of the Communist Party of Iran, they began extensive activities in Guilan. Mirza Kuchak Khan and Ehsanullah Khan did not agree with the expansion of the activities of the communists and somehow came up against it (Madani, 1996: 183).

3. **Socialist Party of Iran:** After the opening of the fourth parliament, the leaders of the old rival democratic and moderate parties, namely, Soleiman Mirza Eskandari and Mohammad Sadegh Tabatabai, are united with each other and created the Socialist Party of Iran (Bahar, 1992: 59-57). Later, Soleiman Eskandari was elected as the first secretary of the Tudeh Party of Iran.
Formation of the Tudeh Party of Iran

In 1931, at the height of the dictatorship of Reza Shah, a law was passed in the National Assembly according to which any propaganda of the Marxist ideology and shared terms was forbidden (Abrahamian, 1998: 348). The only Iranian communist journal "Donya", based on the above law was detained in 1935 and Iranian communists were in a bottleneck. In response to this move by Iran in 1938, the Soviet government expelled about 3,500 Iranian immigrants and this has added to the tensions between the two countries. This situation remained stable until the occupation of Iran in 1941 (Hooshang Mahdavi, 1994: 34-33).

In those years when the police banned all communist activities, the 1931 Act, which was apparently approved for national security was implemented. Everyone who violated this law was sentenced to ten years in prison. Of course, the adoption of such laws could not prevent the opposition. In 1934, students of the Faculty of Medicine set up a successful strike to dismiss the head of the faculty appointed by the government. In 1936, 300 students of teachers in disagree with the proposal, which they should teach after graduating with low salaries in state schools, went to another successful strike (Abrahamian, 1998: 192). Meanwhile, some protests were accompanied by intense government response and reaction. In April 1937, the police arrested 53 people on charges of forming a secret Shared organization, publishing a May Day statement (Labor Day), organizing strikes at the University of Tehran and the Isfahan Textile Company and translating (Alhadi books) such as Capital Marx and Communist Manifesto.

Although five of the arrestees were immediately released, this group was named "fifty three people". The same people formed the initial core of the Tudeh Party a few years later. Most of the forty-eight people who were tried in October 1938 belonged to the young generation of Persian-speaking intellectuals living in Tehran (Abrahamian, 1998: 193). Only nine of them were from the low classes and five from Azerbaijan. It seems that for the first time in Iran, a Marxist group had recruited from non-Azerbaijani and non-Armenian intellectuals. At the end of the trial, out of these 48 people, 3 were acquitted, but they were turned into other provinces. Ten were sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten years. The main character of "Fifty-Three Persons" was a 36-year-old professor of physics at the University of Tehran named "Taghi Arani". Arani graduated with a first degree from the Academy of Sciences and the Faculty of Medicine and in 1923 he went to Germany using a government stock exchange. While studying a Ph.D. in chemistry at the University of Berlin, he taught at the Arabic Language Institute. He wrote three pamphlets about Persian culture and literature on Omar Khayyam, Saadi and Naser Khosrow. Arani gradually turned to modern socialism from Iranian nationalism. As one of the publications of those years wrote in Arani's biography; Ariany became very interested in "ChauvinismeBritish contract were -when studying in Tehran that nationalist struggles against Iran "ongoing. He, like many contemporaries believed that it was only through the purification of the Persian language of foreign words, the revival of the ancient Zoroastrian religion and the restoration of a centralized state such as the Sassanid state that one could save the country from backwardness and imperialism (Mardom Monthly Journal, 5 June 1960, Quoted by: Abrahamian, 1998, 194-195). Arani published several articles in Iranshahr and Farangistan newspapers that had nationalist attitudes. During his later years in Germany, he studied the works of Marx, Engels, Kautsky and Lenin carefully and enthusiastically. He was very interested in the movements of the European left and he collaborated with the newspaper Peakar. When he returned to Iran, he was a conscious Marxist and believed socialist,

1 - Some members of fifty-three had a history of fighting in the forest movement such as Dr. Reza Radmanesh, Morteza Yazdi and others. The job for eighty people was: thirteen students, twelve government employees, four university professors, three physicians, three high school teachers, two lawyers, two mechanics, two factory workers, one businessman, one writer, one cloak, one dish, one typist, one railroad employee and one farmer. In terms of ethnic origin, the group had 36 Persian speaking people, seven Azeri, two Qajar and a Turkman (Abrahamian: 193)

2 - This term is itself the name of the "Niclashön" of Napoleon's deliverance who so-called in obedience to Napoleon. Today, this term is meaning the extreme excessive patriotism in patriotism. Look: Political Schools, Baha'addin Pasargad, 123
although he was not a member of the communist sect. When taught at the University of Tehran, Arani formed Student Discussion Groups and published their theoretical magazine with their old colleagues who came back from Europe. Police arrested them after Arany's group distributed May 1st (Labor Day) Statement in Tehran University. Arani was arrested, convicted and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment at the head of 53 People Group. He died in a prison hospital sixteen months later (Abrahamian, 1998, 194-199). His friends and colleagues said police were killed him. As one of the left writers wrote later that Arani, the son of dignified of our nation was martyred at Reza Khan Jail (N. Jami, 1983: 150). However, the police claimed that Arani’s death was due to the typhus. However, Arani is considered the first intellectual founder of the Tudeh Party.

Initial Organization of the Tudeh Party

Following the resignation of Reza Shah and the release of political prisoners in September 1941, initial steps were taken to form the Tudeh Party. Twenty-seven of the young members of the "Fifty-Three Marxist Prisoners in 1937 " announced the formation of an ambitious political organization of the Tudeh Party of Iran on September 7th (thirteen days after the resignation of Reza Shah) by convening a gathering in Tehran.

The party's leading figures identified Soleiman Eskandari who had good campaign backgrounds, as the secretary-general of the party. The group had four temporary and primary objectives: 1. The remaining 50 felons; 2. Recognition of the Tudeh Party as a legitimate organization; 3. Publication of the newspaper; 4. Preparation and drafting of a plan without provoking opposition from religious scholars to attract Democrats, Socialists and old-fashioned communists and even radical non-Marxists. The group had four primary and secondary objectives: 1. The freedom of remaining fifty-three people; 2. Recognition of the Tudeh Party as a legitimate organization; 3. Publication of the newspaper; 4. Preparation and drafting of a plan without provoking opposition from religious scholars to attract Democrats, Socialists and old-fashioned communists and even radical non-Marxists. The party achieved four goals in less than six months (Abrahamian, 1998: 347). The Tudeh Party issued its provisional program in early March of 1941. The program emphasized the need to eliminate the dictatorship of Reza Shah, protecting the constitution, civil liberties and human rights, protecting the rights of all citizens, especially the rights of the Tudeh and assisting in the global democracy struggle against the wildebeest of fascism. At the first congress, a party leader said: "The Tudeh Party aims to unite the Tudeh, workers, peasants, merchants, progressive intellectuals and craftsmen." Of course, these classes are economically different, but in contemporary Iran, this difference has been overshadowed by a common struggle against imperialism, absent landlords, exploitative capitalists and industrial plunderers owners. Our task is to unite the exploited classes and create a party composed of the Tudeh "(Iraj Eskandari - The Perspective of the First Party Congress, 4 September 1944).

The Tudeh Party initially left Marxist to prevent clerical attacks; held the anniversary of the death of Arani in a religious way and remembering Arani, the cleric of the opposition against Reza Shah and Farrokh Yazdi, a sharp but very religious poet, arranged an extensive gathering (Abrahamian, 1998: 348). Although the founders of the Tudeh Party did not consider themselves Communists, they were pro-Soviet advocates. In addition to the fear of the scholars, due to the existence of the 1931 Constitution which prohibited any "share rule", the twenty-five-year government propaganda that had created a hostile attitude toward socialism and communism and the Soviet Union and its interest in recruiting reformists, radicals and progressive revolutionaries, they concealed their main goals and intentions. Basically, that's why they put their party name away from the Marxist terms of the "Tudeh Party of Iran".

3 - Soleiman Mirza Eskandari, though his lineage comes to Fathali Shah Qajar, he fought in the Constitutional Revolution and he took part In the Democrats' constitution in the second parliament, he led the National Resistance Committee in the First World War and it was the responsibility of the Secretary General of the Socialist Party from 1921 until the dissolution of 1926. RE: KAMBAHSH "Reflections on the history of the Tudeh Party, spring 1967, NO. 7
As one of the fifty-three members writes that The plan and practice of a Communist Iranian person should be designed on the needs of Iran. If a Communist Iranian in Iran considers the program of the Communist Party of Germany or one of the world's industrial countries in which industrial workers have a regular organization and a stable power, this act and way of thinking is knocking head to the wall. Such a person is not a communist and is completely unaware of Marxist philosophy and dialectical logic "(Alawi, 1978: 190).

**The Program, Propaganda and Initial Orientation of the Tudeh Party**

The Tudeh Party, with the start of its activities, declared the first slogan of the struggle to be the resistance of all classes and groups of libertarians against the return of dictatorship and emphasizing two points:

1. Obtaining the freedoms recognized by the Constitution for the Iranian people.

2. Preventing reaction and tyranny by relying on the collective power of the Iranian masses

The Tudeh Party also declared its basic principles at the time of its establishment as follows:

(A) To preserve the independence and integrity of Iran

(B) Establishing a regime of democracy and providing personal and social rights, such as freedom of speech and pen and beliefs and communities

(C) The struggle against any dictatorship and autocracy

(D) The necessary reforms in the use of land and agriculture and the improvement of the situation of farmers and peasants and the mass of Iran's labor (Jami, 1983: 151).

Initially, the party's propaganda programs were so as they showed believed in the religion of Islam. The party answers the questioned what religion is? As: "The Tudeh Party of Iran is a supporter of Hanif's Islam and Shariah of Mohammadi's religion "(Rahbar, No. 281), 9 May 1943).

In the following, the views of the Tudeh Party are as follows: Most party people are Muslims and born from Muslims and have a special interest in the Sharia Muhammad and they will never resort to a way that does not deal with this religion and they do not accept the conflict with which they are contradictory" (Rahbar, No, 257, 11 March 1944). The Tudeh party scope was added increasingly due to the overthrow of the peasant classes of workers and the poor in the society. In the meantime, they initially eschewed their original status and they always introduced themselves as progressive, anti-fascist, opposed to imperialism, the working-class party and peasantry and so on (Madani, 1997: 301).

**Expansion of the Tudeh Party in Iran**

The Tudeh Party was first active in the Northern provinces, Tehran and Isfahan, but soon it expanded its scope to central, southern and even small towns. In the Northern provinces, the party has more than 20,000 people in 21 cities and in 9 out of 17 cities with 10 to 20 thousand people have branches. In the southern provinces, in 6 out of 23 cities with a population of over 20,000 such as Isfahan, Arak, Qom, Hamedan and Kermanshah had hidden branches and networks. The expansion and strength of the Party in the Northern regions was related to the radical and vicissitudinous history of the Guilan and Azerbaijan, the existence of newly established factories in Tehran and Mazandaran and Soviet support (Abrahamian, 1998: 355-357). On the other hand, some of the main members of the party leadership were former members of the Socialist Party or the Communist Party whose activities were mostly in the North
and West of Iran. The prominent personalities of the party, such as Qabbari, Rousta, Avansian, Radmanesh, Amirkhizi and Zia al-Mutati were from this category.

In the 14th parliamentary elections, the Tudeh Party had twenty-three candidates, of whom eight had won the election - Two people in Guilan (this province had two candidates), two in Khorasan, one in Tehran, one in Mazandaran, one in Isfahan and one in the North Armenian constituency. These 23 candidates by over 20,000 votes, received more than 70 percent of votes cast and in their constituencies, received more than 13 percent of the country's total votes (Rahbar, 4 August 1944, a report on election results, R. Radmannish).

The extension of the Tudeh party continued after the election. More than 25 thousand people participated in the funeral of Soleiman Eskandari in Isfahan that was the largest street demonstration in the history of the city. The second anniversary of the establishment of the Tudeh Party in Tehran was attended by more than 30 thousand people that were the largest public gathering in Iranian history (Mardom, 23 October 1943).

Of course, the most important success of the Tudeh Party was the organization of workers. At the first congress of the party which was a form of power show, there were 169 people from across the country (Madani, 1996: 302). As a result, the spread of the Tudeh Party continued in the southern provinces. This Party has branches in all forty-four cities with more than 20,000 people and established six provincial newspapers. The party could announce that it has become a national party with organized branches in the southern and northern provinces (Rahbar, 8 January 1945). The Tudeh party held massive street demonstrations. In early October 1944, the Tudeh Party held large gatherings in twenty-two cities in protest against the government's refusal to grant oil scores to the Soviet Union. According to the US Embassy, more than 35,000 people held regular demonstrations outside the parliament building which eventually led to the collapse of the Saed State (Abrahamian, 1998: 368). On the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution, the party held a march of sixty thousand in Tehran (American Ambassador to the State Department October 27, 1994, New York Times March 17, 1945).

The US ambassador writes in a report on these marches: The Tudeh Party is the only well-organized and efficient political machine in Iran. For this reason, the Prime Minister (Qawam) wants to reconcile with the Tudeh party in the coming election "(New York times 15 June 1996, 17 March 1945). The party which had found a base among the intellectuals organizes local people. A formed a special organization for both young people and women.

The Era of Prosperity and Success of the Tudeh Party

The most amazing successes of the Tudeh Party were in Khuzestan Province. After four years of limited underground activity among the workers of the oil company, the party displayed its power on the Labor Day in 1325, organizing an 80,000 people rally in Abadan. The party's full power was determined in the general strike by over sixty-five thousand Khuzdestani workers. This was the biggest strike of industrial workers in the history of the Middle East. In July 1946, Qavam assigned three posts of the Ministry of Health, Culture and Arts to three members of the Tudeh Party "Dr. Morteza Yazdi, Dr. Fereidoon Keshavarz and Iraj Eskandari" and it was the peak victory of the Tudeh Party (Abrahamian, 1998, 373). From the viewpoint of Western observers at that time, the Tudeh Party had about 50,000 members and a total of 100,000 active members. According to an American correspondent, the party effectively led the country's workers. According to the British press, the Tudeh Party's Freedom Front had influenced many of the 172 newspapers, magazines and publications published in 1946. British military affiliate writes in her report that: In the provinces of the Caspian Sea, all Iranian officials from the governor down operate on the Tudeh Party control. No government official is allowed to send telegram messages. The railway administration is fully at the hands of the Tudeh Party. In fact, the Tudeh Party can
take things if it wishes. ”(British Military Attache to the foreign office, 25 January 1946.F.O.371 Parsia 1946 / 34-52710)

The successes and significant expansion of the Tudeh Party activities have led the British government to think about a solution and designed a plan to stop and weaken it.

**Suppression of the Tudeh Party**

The British government which was severely threatened by the spread of Party activities began its preventive initiatives to prevent these activities that are:

1- Strengthening the Armed Forces in Iraq
2- Sending warships to Abadan
3- Encouraging tribal and tribal rebels to form pro-Western self-governing governments in southern provinces.
4- Determining the British Embassy to undermine the Tudeh Party by finding evidence of the party's relations with the Soviet Union
5- Create divisions within the party

However, the English have succeeded in many of the above cases, but they failed to find evidence that there was a relationship between the main members of the party and the Soviet Union (Abrahamian, 1998: 37, 4). The British conceived the deployment of warships to the coastal waters of Iran and the strengthening of Basra's garrison to protect the interests of the empire and care in the flow of oil. The Tudeh Party had a huge influence on oil workers. When some people called the Khuzestan State Association through a telegram to Qawam called for the same rights as were known to the Democrats of Azerbaijan, the Tudeh Party mobilized its forces and on July 16, 1946, some hundreds of thousands of Abadan refinery workers and other well-off oil fields went on strike. In bloody clashes, some were killed and wounded and the Tudeh Party has been demolishing the refinery and destroyed about 300,000 tons of crude oil. Under these circumstances, English made a series of military actions (Hooshang Mahdavi, 1990: 432).

With the insurgency of the tribes in the south and the uprising of Naser Khan Qashqai in Shiraz as leader of the Fars movement which urged the government of Qawam to dismiss the three Tudeh ministers and give Fars province some concessions like Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Khuzestan, the situation in the country became absolutely critical.

The British and their practitioners in the oil company helped all the insurgents. Qawam was not satisfied with the spread of the southern insurgency and intends to use it for pressure to the Tudeh Party and the Democrats in Azerbaijan. So he resigned from the prime minister and on the morrow after the resignation (18 October 1946) that again became the officer of the cabinet formation, left the three Tudeh ministers and Muzafar Firuz (the senior adviser and deputy chairman of the parliament who left the extreme tendency) from the cabinet (Hooshang Mahdavi, 1990: 433). The intense reversal of Qawam to the right and reigning in the northwestern provinces was the starting point for four years of continuous repression of the Tudeh Party (Abrahamian, 1998: 375). Qawam first announced, on the pretext of holding a fifteen parliamentary election that the army should be fluent in the country for the sake of order and care in the good conduct of the elections. This was strongly opposed by the Tudeh Party and the Democratic Sect. But Qawam, assured by the strength of the army, issued an order to invade Azerbaijan on the pretext of the election. At the same time, he informed the UN Secretary-General of the plan of the Iranian government to liberalize Azerbaijan.
Government forces easily arrived in Tabriz. The main pillar of the army, led by Colonel Hossein Hashemi broke the Democrats' resistance to QaflanKuh. While Sadhikov, the Soviet ambassador to Iran, requested the government to prevent the army from entering Tabriz, but the readiness of the insurgents to surrender unconditionally shows that efforts in this area are no longer worthless. In fact, the people of Tabriz rose up before the units of the army reached the Miyaneh and they themselves had liberated the city from the Democrats. Some of the leaders of the Democratic sect were arrested and Seyyed Ja'far Pishevari, their leader, also fled to the Soviet Union.

In February 1947, government forces ended the Republic of Kurdistan age by entering to Mahabad City. The leaders of the Koumle party were executed. With the end of the problem of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and the arrest of some of the leaders of the Tudeh party in Tehran, the government was on the verge of power. However, some of the sources are related non-direct Soviet involvement in the Azerbaijani issue to the US President Truman's doctrine and the Qawam-Sadchikov agreement, which the Iranian government later considered as "the treaty" (Hooshang Mahdavi, 1991: 437).

After the breakup of the separatists, the government went to the Tudeh Party. In the course of the repression of the Tudeh Party in Isfahan, the military occupied the main offices of the party. Khuzestan military governor exiled party leaders and the oil company dismissed more than 1,000 problematic workers (in the opinion of Ibrahimians) and basically related to the Tudeh Party. In Kermanshah, 12 militant Tudeh were killed by police shotgun. In Tehran, the government banned all street gatherings by establishing military rule. On the sidelines of the Caspian Sea, the military court sentenced three activists to death for designing an armed uprising and sentenced four people to life imprisonment. The bloodiest clashes took place in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, during which 500 insurgents were killed. 1200 Azerbaijani and 10,000 Kurds fled to the Soviet Union. However, these repressions hit the party hard, but the government did not completely dissolve the party, but allowed the central party organization to hold non-fateful gatherings and publish newspaper. These things may have been different reasons. One was that Western embassies, especially the British, believed that putting a clear-cut valve for public discontent was wise! Second, Qawam hoped that one day he could use the Tudeh party against the King. On the other hand, the government did not want to unlawfully declare the Tudeh party to oppose the Russians (Ibrahimian, 1998: 376). The Party's suppression led to strong controversy among party members. They revived their activities in February 1950. This time, the party's activities were linked to the issue of nationalization of oil led by Dr. Mosaddeq, but after the coup of 19 August 1953, they were again severely suppressed.

**Disappointment Reasons of the Tudeh Party to Fight the Pahlavi Regime**

The reasons for the failure of the Tudeh Party to fight the Pahlavi regime can be summarized as follows:

1- The Pahlavi regime's hard encounter with the party and its severe crackdown. These repressions were accompanied by negative propaganda and psychological warfare against the Tudeh Party by the regime.

2- Socioeconomic transformations resulting from rapid modernization. If the government makes economic and social reforms, people are pursuing better opportunities for government reform, not party and group efforts.

3- Party splits and intra-party differences. Branches such as the Marxist-Leninist organization, "Toufan"; the Tudeh revolutionary organization in the outside world, the Tudeh Youth Organization and the Workers' Party of the Iranian People (Third Force) and etc (Rafizadeh, 2005: 229-227).


Take a look at the North Oil Score

At the time of awarding Darcy, five Northern provinces of Iran, namely, Azerbaijan, Guilan, Mazandaran, Astarabad and Khorasan, were adjacent to Russia, were excluded from all areas in order not to grant concessions to the Russians. Therefore, the awarded concessions and activities in these five provinces are classified in the next category, which are called the North Oil Field or the "North Oil".

The issue of North Oil has been raised in two parts in contemporary Iranian history, one in the first years after the coup dated 22 February 1921 and others after September 1940 during the Second World War and the occupation of Iran. The importance of the issue of North Oil in this era is twofold: First, Iranian politicians used northern oil to realize the doctrine of proximity to the Third Force (Third Power) in Iranian foreign policy and the other is that Iran at this two stage was the scene of the great powers' rivalry (Massoudnia, 2008: 99).

After the arrival of Iran into the international politics, the negative consequence of the Russian-British competition in Iran has caused some Iranian officials to become interested in third-party politics, a policy that became known as the Third Force doctrine. According to many advocates of third-party policy, one of the appropriate ways to implement this doctrine is to engage third-party governments or oil companies owned by them in the northern oil reserves of Iran.

In pursuit of this policy, the Iranian government decided to hand over North American oil to US companies. Iran's Deputy Minister of Justice in Washington (Hussein Alaa) has been actively trying to persuade US oil companies to earn points for petroleum in northern Iran. In August 1920, the efforts of the Iranian Minister of the Interior came to an end and the US State Department informed him that American companies were demanding to obtain petroleum credits in northern Iran (Zhouqi, 1994: 201). Following the approval of the US Department of State with the help of Morgan Shuster, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs began negotiations with representatives of the New Jersey Standard Oil Company (documents from the North Petroleum License, Presidential Office, Document No. 101).

In this situation, the National Assembly approved a bill by the government to award a 50-year license to extraction and exploitation of oil mines from the northern provinces of northern Iran to New Jersey's Standard Oil Company in five articles. The ratification of this privilege by the National Assembly led to the official British and Soviet protest (Fateh, 1957: 334). The Iranian government responded to the protests. The British, who heard the accusatory response of the Iranian government, tried to partner with the standard American company to exploit the northern oil franchise. The Iranian parliament, by amending Articles 1 and 5 of the Standard Contest, prevented the British from entering the issue. In the meantime, another American company, Sinclair, also expressed its desire to earn oil revenues. As a result, the conflict between the two American companies began to exploit oil from northern Iran. Finally, Sinclair Company succeeded in obtaining the consent of the Iranian government to earn points. In the House, a celebration was held to the award of the Sinclair Company, and Reza Khan (Sardar Sepah), as prime minister, told the US Embassy staffer: We want to eliminate British and Russian economic domination and giving concessions to an American company would be the introduction of a stronger relationship between Iran and the United States "(Zargar, 1993: 103). These words did not make a difference, because both English and competitors and rival companies, Evil standard, used a variety of barriers to prevent the success of Sinclair's company and the company did not go ahead.

Soviet Union and North Oil Ratings

Following the efforts of American and British companies to earn North Oil scores, the Soviets also applied for this privilege. In September 1944, Sergei Kavtaradze, the Under-Secretary of the National Commission on Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, arrived in Tehran at the head of a delegation of oil experts from the country (in the form of talks of the National Assembly, No. 1330, 19 October 1944).
After meeting with the Prime Minister (Saed), he announced that the Soviet oil companies were interested in studying the Kavirkhoryan oil scores (Zhouqi, 1993: 213). Of course, agreeing to enter Kaftaradze was the result of many domestic and foreign political pressures and considered a kind of political maneuver. In particular, the Soviet government was pushing for American and British companies to oppose the granting of petroleum credits and complained to the Iranian government and he even disagreed with the presence of the US military in Iran (Lancheksky, 1973: 304). The main mission of Kavtaradze was kept at the beginning and the Saline government announced that the delegation had just been sent to Tehran to negotiate oil Khouryari with the Iranian government. But since the main goal of the Soviet Union was to obtain the oil price of the northern part of Iran, this aim is kept secret in the proposal to form a mixed Iranian and Russian company to extract and exploit the northern oil of Iran (Aramesh, 1991: 23). With the clarification of the goals of Kavtaradze, a sharp conflict create between the supporters of the allocation of the North Oil Score to salvation and the opposition to the transfer of this privilege, especially in the National Assembly. Representatives of the Soviet Union, who were often members of the Tudeh Party, pushed the government tough for Soviet oil demands and the affiliated press was thrusting the Soviets to the government and opponents of concessions (Shahedi, 1998: 72).

On the contrary, supporters of the British government, such as Seyyed Ziauddin Tabatabai, strongly criticized the Soviet oil demand and pushed the government to prevent seriously from the agreement with the demand of Kavtaradze (Chaudoran, 1973: 271-270). In this situation, Kavtaradze had a meeting with the King of Iran and urged him to use his influence and encourage the government to grant the North oil concession to the Soviet Union. Kavtaradze personally warned the king that the economic relations between the two countries in the future will depend on the response of the Iranian government to the demand for Soviet oil. The king rejected the request of Kavtaradze and reminded that the decision in this area falls to the government and even with the consent of the government, the National Assembly must approve the agreement (Zhouqi, 1993: 213).

**Tudeh Party and North Petroleum Score**

When representatives of US oil companies enter into negotiations with the Iranian government for exploiting crude oil mines, Iran also expressed interest in those proposals. The goal of Iran was to neutralize the plan of the UK government, which bought Khoshdari's disadvantage in the Northern provinces with the intention of seizing oil and transfer the exploitation of the northern oil mines to a third-party power that does not have territorial and political interests in Iran. In this way, it would halt itself from the powerful North Neighboring Ambitions and the powerful southern neighbors and thirst for oil. Meanwhile, the transfer of North American oil to American companies constituted the ultimate goal of the Iranian government (Zhouqi, 1993: 201).

Until the issue of Soviet demand had not come to an end, the Tudeh Party was opposed to any divestment of oil. On 10 August 1944, at a public hearing of the National Assembly, Tutsi, the representative of Bojnourd, asked a question about the government talks with the representatives of the American oil partners from the Prime Minister (Mohammad Sa'ed Maraghei) and asked for clarification. At the same meeting, Dr. Radnamesh, a spokesman for the Tudeh Party fraction, also raised questions that Sa'ed answered to the questions (the form of negotiations between the National Assembly, 1929, 10 August 1944). After the Prime Minister's response, Radmansh stated in a statement that he and his comrades disagree in general with giving any privileges to foreign governments. As the Iranian nation built its own railways, I am sure that, with the help of the people and the domestic capital, we can extract all the wealth of this country and we may be able to recover from the misery of the people of this country "(Jami, 1983: 215; Fateh, 1956: 354).
The Positions of the Tudeh Party Before Applying Concession from the Soviet Union

In general, the positions of the Tudeh Party before the official request of the Soviet Union to exploit North Oil can be summarized as follows:

1- The Tudeh Party of Iran is opposed to concessions to foreign governments in general

2- The Tudeh Party of Iran is certain that it is possible to extract resources from the country with the help of people and domestic capital.

3- The Tudeh Party of Iran believes that the government should have consulted the National Assembly before the beginning of the negotiations.

4- The views of the Tudeh Party of Iran to grant foreign states privileges is general and does not consider it to be exceptional for any foreign government. Particularly, until that date, no suggestion had been presented to the Iranian government regarding the northern oil concession from the Soviet government (Jami, 1983: 216-2167).

Under these conditions, newspapers affiliated with the Tudeh Party regularly warned people that no concessions should be left to US and British companies. In this case, the Azhir newspaper wrote: Awake, do not cheat, do not be deceived, Iran's wealth is Iran's own. It can only be extracted by the Iranian nation "(Azhir No. 172; 27 July 1944).

The procedure of the Tudeh Party and its affiliated newspapers continued until after the Iranian government, Saed (Prime Minister), during the private session of the National Assembly on 8 October, declared that the cabinet has decided that the issue of granting oil concessions will remain silent until the end of the war and the world's economic situation. And on 12 October 1944, Prime Minister Saed informed Kavtaradze that the Iranian government would not give any concessions to any country until the end of the war. This response of the Iranian government was faced with a sharp reaction by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (Zhouqi, 1993: 214). A few days after the Iranian government's response to the Soviet request, Kavtaradze arranged a press interview and he spoke about the benefits of granting this privilege to Iran and expressed the hope that the public opinion in Iran, represented by the "liberal press", would contribute to the progress of this (granting of oil saltiness privilege).

Tudeh Party Positions after Applying for a Concession from the Soviet Union

Following the Kavtaradze interview, the Tudeh Party and the affiliated press accepted his invitation and held demonstrations in Tehran against the state of Saed (Jami, 1983: 232). The Soviet government benefits from at least three different bases for putting pressure on and imposing its opinions and demands on the Iranian government:

1- Soviet Armed Forces in Iran

2- Tudeh Party

3- About fifteen to twenty parliamentarians and their affiliated newspapers

The Tudeh advocates of the parliament, who themselves strongly opposed the granting of any privileges to oil companies during the war, called the Soviet government a "balance" policy. It means that, because the British had the advantage of the South Oil, the government should give the North Sea privilege to the Soviet government to establish a balance. One of Tudeh's affiliate newspapers wrote on this issue that the Northern regions of Iran are the basis of the Soviet Union's security and this government will never be willing to place a hostile detachment against him in the name of oil. In the same
way that we have interests in the UK in Iran, the state of Soviet Union also has serious interests in terms of its security in Iran "(People for Intellectuals, 10 November 1944).

Tudeh's Balance Policy Fails with Plan gave by Democrat Leader, Seyyed Mehdi Farrokh Rahbar to Parliament. Under this plan, as long as there are foreign forces in Iran, any concessions to any of the occupying countries will be declared illegal (Farah, Bita, 681). The project was officially presented to parliament on 2 December 1944 by Dr. Mossadegh entitled "Negative Balance", noting that any of the callers of points of interest, not the northern neighbor, nor the southern neighbor, nor the US government, will be given a new one. The draft was approved by the majority of the votes of the members of the National Assembly (Zhouqi, 1993: 221-220). On the next day, Ghouchan's representative (Gholam Hossein Rahimian) presented a plan for inducing the South Oil Score as a single item in the House. The single article of this project was as follows: The Iranian National Assembly initiates the Southern Oil Score which was given to the Darcy Company during the autocracy and during the dictatorship it has been extended and renewed in accordance with this law. Rahimian said to Dr. Mossadegh after reading his proposal that "doctor, you suggested and approved yesterday's plan for not granting any privileges to foreigners, so you are the first person to sign this project". Dr. Mossadegh has refused to sign the plan and said we can not terminate the contract unilaterally (Fateh, 1956: 357).

The Tudeh Party of Iran made a statement on the granting of oil concession to the Soviet government in one of the newspapers: Providing the privilege of the northern oil with much more favorable conditions and the conditions of the renewal and threat that undertook under the banner and responsibility of Mr. Taghizadeh (the signatory of the 1933 agreement) is currently in the interest of Iran in political and economic terms. Given this privilege will be established the political and economic relations between the Iranian government and the Soviet Union. Perhaps the reason for opposition of the reactionaries with this privilege is that they do not want such a behavior of the Soviet government with workers before the eyes of the Iranians (Razm, 9 November 1944, Jami, 1983:225). The political and military pressures of the Soviet government, the pressure of the Tudeh Party and ultimately, the ultimatum of the Soviet government (due to the death of a Russian officer in the demonstrations of 5 November 1944) put the state of Saed in jeopardy. Sa'ed resigned to prevent the deterioration of the crisis. The next Cabinet was formed by Morteza Gholi Bayat (Saham Al-Sultan). In the government of Bait, Mosadegh's balance of power was approved by the parliament and both the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party did not go ahead.

The Soviet Objectives of the North Petroleum Demand

The Soviet Union's propaganda machine has repeatedly stated that the Soviet Union was very rich in oil resources, as such; it has the first place in the world. The question now is what was the incentive for the Soviet government to claim for the northern oil price? Iranian foreign policy researchers have given two different answers to this question. Some believe that given the importance of the Soviet southern borders for this country and the presence of oil fields in the Caucasus region, the Soviet Union was worried that if the Iranian government were to hand over the price of North oil to Western companies, the security of the southern borders of Russia and the oil fields in the area would be compromised. From the point of view of Russian politicians, the best way to deal with this threat was to obtain the northern oil points of Iran and to prevent the presence of Western companies in the vicinity of Soviet southern borders (Massoudnia, 2008: 96-119). George Kenan, a US embassy official in Moscow, writes in a report to the US State Department at the height of the oil crisis in Iran: The main purpose of the recent Soviet actions in northern Iran is probably not just to obtain oil resources, but it was feared that the potential of foreign forces in northern Iran would have been influenced. Kenan writes in the continuation of his report: To maintain Soviet security, the Kremlin considers important the issue that no major foreign power should even have the chance to obtain a footprint in northern Iran "(Zhouqi, 1993: 224). Others believe that, despite the initial understanding between Britain and the Soviet Union in Iran, the Soviet attempt to capture the northern oil scores due to balancing the theory of equilibrium in its relations with Britain in
Iran. The examination of documents and the analysis of the Soviet demands indicates that both the security of the Soviet frontiers and the Soviet-British competition in Iran have been effective in deciding Soviet leaders to obtain the northern oil score (Massoudnia, 2008: 96 -119). Some other points can be added to examine the incentives of the Soviet Union to achieve the North Oil Score. They really needed oil. Despite being said to be rich in oil resources, because they had devoted a significant part of the Kahu oil products to post-war domestic uses, they wanted to compete with the United States and the United Kingdom on the world oil markets using North Iranian oil. On the other hand, the oil resources of northern Iran and the oil resources of the Caucasus are in the same area. According to the Russians, exploitation of the oil resources of northern Iran causes the drying of oil wells in the Caucasus region that this issue was also of interest to the Russians.

Another point that can not be easily overlooked is that Moscow was seeking to use the Western rivalry in the Iranian oil issue as the best excuse and reason for intervening in Iran's political affairs. Because the general policy of the Soviet Union in Iran was based on this principle that the economic situation and policy of neighboring countries should not be determined by other powers. The result was that the request of the Soviet government for the privilege of the northern oil was, in fact, part of the government's need for a protection and security belt in northern Iran against its long-standing and traditional enemy, England and a newcomer as the United States (Zhouqi, 1996: 185). These goals and demands of the Soviet Union failed to meet the record of the country's relations with Iran by approving a bill prohibiting oil concessions.

The Reasons for Iran's Opposition to the Soviet Request

The main and real reason for the Iranian government to refuse to give up its oil concession to the Soviet Union should be sought in the policy and attitude of the Soviet government towards Iran. Sa'ed government knew with certainty that exploiting Iran's northern oil by the Soviet Union meant to end Iran's sovereignty and independence. The reason was that the Soviet Union, with this privilege, could have isolated the Northern states of Iran as an occupation of the Soviet Union simply from Iran. The affiliated national and democratic newspapers also considered the Soviets try to violate Iran's sovereignty and independence (Bakhtar, 26 October 1944).

Emrooz Raad newspaper wrote that now the issue is not oil, but the issue of the freedom and independence of Iran and indeed the existence of Iran "(Raad, 20 October 1944). In spite of the nature of Tehran's supreme leader, that the Soviet leader was also its signatory and given the actual activities of the Soviet Union in Iran and its interventions in the internal affairs of the country, it should be said that the decomposition of the national existence of Iran has been the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union (Zhouqi, 1993: 228). While the Soviets demanded a request for oil concessions without prior discussion and did not make a clear statement of their positions and announced that the financial negotiations and the type of payment after acquire the score will be determined, this matter could not be accepted by the Iranian government at all.

Soviet Reaction after Iran's Opposition to Concessions

After the bill prohibition of oil refining talks was passed, the Russians did not leave the field. They did not get the oil concession; instead, they have achieved something that is very beneficial to governments and great powers- complaint and oppression with all its permanent values. The next Iranian government which has taken Saed's oil policy was accused of being reactionary and Fascist, because they took advantage of the Soviet Union government to prevent the interests of their "foreign leaders" and imperialists (Rahbar, 26 October 1944; Zafar, 27 October 1944). More importantly, the refusal to grant the oil concession to the Soviet Union is a major obstacle to improving relations between Iran and the Soviet Union (Razm, 8 November 1944).
The Russians considered the decision of the Iranian government a kind of discrimination that was contrary to the principle of "equal opportunity" and "equal rights" and to provide the necessary facilities for all peace-loving countries. The claim of equal opportunity of the Russians unwittingly relates to the situation of Iran during the Qajar period when the two empires of Russia and England competed for losing their resources and the inconsistent fate and strategic position of Iran in the Gulf of Persia and Central Asia. Iran had put Iran in between the Russian smut and the British anvil. Although the Russian and British policies and their motives in Iran were different at that time, it was similar in terms of rivalry for the looting of this country (Kazemzadeh, 1992: 135). The Reuters concession and the same privilege that Russians took from Iran at that time confirms this theory.

After Iran rejected the Soviet request for an oil refusal, the issue of "non-observance of equality" was continuously discussed in the Soviet newspapers and its related media in Iran (Doost of Iran; Journal of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran; December 13, 1944; Rahbar, 10 December 1944). Of course, it should not be overlooked that Darcy's privilege in 1901 was completely free and without threat and pressure and only negotiated on the basis of commercial and material interests and its revival was made in 1933 in a critical atmosphere. That crisis had been created by Reza Shah, but at the same time, its benefits were superior to Darcy's main advantage.

The principle of equal opportunity that the Soviet government claimed was more political in nature than economic and commercial aspects, because the decision of the Soviet government to obtain oil concession was a sudden decision. On the other hand, Darcy's privilege was not granted without prior negotiation and determination of its financial conditions, while Kavtaradze, the head of the Soviet delegation, not only did not propose financial matters, he also stated that negotiations should be conducted on the type of money on which payments should be made after a score will be awarded (Zhouqi, 1993: 224-230). Finally, Kavtaradze, whose attempts to obtain oil scores had not been successful, left Tehran on 8 December 1944 for Moscow. Prior to leave Tehran, during a meeting with the new Prime Minister (Bayat), he criticized the National Assembly's decision not to grant an oil loan and called it a mistake and demanded a revision of the parliament. He recalled that, in the Soviet government's view, the issue was not ended (Bullard's telegram to Iden, the British Foreign Secretary, No. 1316 dated December 9, 1944).

It seems that the Soviet government was not willing to easily escape from Iranian oil, so that some experts believe that Iran's negative response in this regard to the Soviet Union has had serious consequences (Fateh, 1956: 357). Despite all these threats, Iran, which was thinking of joining the Third Force (third-party power), was never ready to give a new privilege to the neighboring Soviet Union that always claiming the northern or the United Kingdom, which only thought of its economic interests in Iran.

The occupation of Iran during World War II and the presence of the Allies in Iran led the Soviet Union to use this opportunity to expand its influence in Iran. The formation of the democrats in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan was one of the most prominent examples of its destructive goals (Jami, 1983, 297). In addition, the Soviet Union insisted on obtaining the crude oil concession from the North and announced that he would not withdraw his troops from Iran to obtain this privilege. While in the Tehran Declaration, signed by the leaders of the three US, British and Soviet states and published in December 1943 (December 1943), stated that the Allies are committed to the independence and territorial integrity of Iran and after the end of the war, they withdraw their troops from Iran. Meanwhile, the King of Iran had emphasized this issue in meetings with the leaders of the three countries (Zhouqi, 1993: 188). In spite of the previous agreement that Stalin signed with the Tehran Declaration, the Soviet Union refused to leave Iran and the breakdown and intervention in internal affairs was one of the goals of the Soviet Union (Zhouqi, 1996: 188).
With these conditions, the Iranian Prime Minister Qawam al-Saltanah later traveled to Moscow and promised to Stalin during the meetings with the leaders of the country to solve the issue of North Oil Score or it will give similar economic privileges to that country, but before any action, the Soviet Union should withdraw its troops from Iran.

The non-eviction of Iran from the Soviet Union led the world's public opinion against the country. Inevitably, under the pressure of international politics and the public opinion of the world, the Soviet Union refused to leave Iran only by signing an agreement to form a mixed Iranian-Soviet company which was officially approved after the approval of the Iranian parliament. In this context, it was said that Truman, the US president, in March 1946 gave ultimatum to Stalin for Iran depletion that if the Soviet Union does not evacuate Iran, the United States will re-enter Iran (this ultimatum was disclosed six years later) (Madani, 1996: 307-311). After these events, in May 2007, the Soviet Union expelled its forces from Iran.

Conclusion

The subject of the oil price of the northern part of Iran was raised in two periods after the coup of March 3, 1921 and after September 1941 and it was of special importance. This issue had its own reasons. First of all, it should be said that Iranian politicians were trying to get close to the third power in foreign policy. Secondly, due to the special geographic location and strategic importance of Iran, such as the proximity to the Great Britain's colony in Asia, that is India and access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and its neighbors to Russia in Central Asia, Iran was hardly minded by both the power of the time of England and Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries. In other words, Iran was a scene of great power competition. In these conditions, it was not inevitable that one of the major goals of the two major colonial powers was to gain access to its vast oil and mines resources. The British earned the Darcy score and later 1933 (South Oil) during the Qajar and Pahlavi periods. Russia and the Soviet Union also did not want to stay behind in Iran in this regard. When American companies started to extract oil from northern Iran, the Soviet government was entered. In the meantime, it used all means of the threat, pressure, and military occupation during the Second World War and its affiliated groups, in particular the Tudeh Party. The Tudeh Party which initially did not rightly aware of a bid to American companies, when the Soviet request was made to obtain a Nordic oil scorecard, it tried with all its power to realize this matter. They, with the help of their representatives in parliament and their affiliated newspapers tried in different ways to convince the Iranian government to grant the oil concession to the Soviet Union, which did not succeed. The Tudeh party itself faced the Pahlavi regime's hard collision at different levels that the peak of the suppression was after the 19 August 1953 coup. Soviet demand for the northern oil balance was not finally reached by approving the deficit plan of Dr. Mosaddeq in the National Assembly. Although the Soviet Union and its affiliated elements, such as the Tudeh Party, put pressure on the Sae'd, Bayat, Qawam al-Saltanah government, but they did not succeed.

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