



A New Attitude to Reduce Tension in the South China Sea

Mehrzad Javadikouchaksaraei

Global Institute for Multidisciplinary Knowledge and Responsible Future, Germany

mehrzadarian@yahoo.com

Abstract

The increasing conflict and instability regarding South China Sea turned over the profound political and economic relations that were formed between China and the ASEAN states since 1997. In 2002, China and the ASEAN countries signed the ASEAN China Declaration of the Conduct of Parties (DOC), but it failed to fulfil the major objectives that involved endorsing a peaceful, welcoming, and pleasant atmosphere in the South China Sea. It is to be noted that the last ten years were full of clashes and conflicts. Thus, the South China Sea has essentially become a possible “battlefield” if discussions or dialogues amongst the relevant participants have not been successfully or well controlled. The basic purpose of this paper is to investigate China’s attitude in the South China Sea disagreements by focusing on its line of attack for handling its demands.

Keyword: *China; ASEAN; South China Sea; Territorial Disputes; Strategy*

Introduction

Since 2009, the conflict and opposition regarding dominance and control has significantly increased in the South China Sea (SCS) among China and the ASEAN claiming states. The fact that has raised questions and anxiety in other states of the world is the instability in the political and economic relationships established between China and the related states since 1997. In accordance with the opinion of Palanca (2007), the relationship between China and the concerned states was previously referred to as “the golden age of partnership”. The major solution to limit this issue is to promote peace at every level so as to ease the atmosphere of tension between China and the ASEAN’s claiming states (Shen, 2011, p.34).

Sea is an important part of strategic thinking and planning of China’s developmental programs and it is significant to understand the importance of sea for China. Factually, the South China Sea was recognized by China as part of its "southern" China Sea and it was named Nan Hai (South Sea). It is quite clear from the Chinese historical records that Chinese have been living in that particular area for more than two thousand years and it is strongly believed that South China Sea has always been a part of its internal lake. As a matter of fact, it is the part of Chinese curriculum as well. The students in China are taught that southern-most area of Chinese region is Zengmu Ansha, also known as James Shoal, which is situated approximately one hundred and sixty kilometres north of Sarawak, Malaysia. In addition, the Scarborough Reef, which is presently



demanded by China as well as the Philippines, is situated in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines' Kalayaan island chain (Bower, 2012, p.98).

From this brief depiction, it is clear that, from Beijing's viewpoint, China is both an East Asian and a Southeast Asian state, with Malaysia, the Philippines, and additionally Vietnam as its southern sea neighbours. To highlight this viewpoint is to underscore the point that China is both a mainland and sea force, imparting its borders to Russia, Korea, India, other than the Southeast Asian states as its neighbours. Additionally, it can be derived that the Chinese are patriots who are worried about discovering ways and intend to recuperate their lost regions and to keep their valuable common mineral and oceanic assets from being snatched away by others. Hence, the power debate in the Spratly Islands have an immediate bearing on China's origination of the ocean and the extent of its maritime modernization, key considering, security and asset intrigues in the South China Seas (Lipson, 1984, P. 32).

Regional tensions in the South China Sea have made divisions inside of the 10-part Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The attachment of ASEAN is undermined by opposing arrangements planned by its part states. In respect to the expanding arguments about regions in the South China Sea, ASEAN part states have differed over the legitimacy of China's wide-reaching to forceful moves in their neighbourhood.

The basic approach of ASEAN is to maintain the unity and impartiality hence not to become a separate entity. Focusing on the relationship between China and USA, both of them are struggling in every possible way to get regional control, but ASEAN has adopted a different strategy of gaining advantage by being a cohesive force rather than a disorganized force. China is attempting hard to get hold of the region but as a matter of fact, Western Pacific, East Asian countries have preferred to be an ally of the United States. Nevertheless, the strategies adopted by these states are kind of neutral as they want to establish relation with China in terms of trade and economy because China is an emerging power in the region. The game is still in the hands of the USA as it can easily tackle the Chinese aggression by adopting a better strategy of increasing trade with the Indo-Pacific region that has the world's most brilliant markets (Torode, 2012).

A brief foundation of China's approaches is critical in comprehending the China's policies deduction and strategies towards the South China Sea in the 21st century period. The primary proposal of this article is that the vital measurements of China's arrangements towards the South China Sea in the twenty first century period can't be separated from its security, political and economic concerns, since China's strategic intuition is not bound to the military measurements be that as it may, be far reaching and all-encompassing in standpoint. In such manner, China's vital deduction is connected to the country's internal security, and political and financial needs. Appropriately, in the twenty first century period, China's essential concern is inside as opposed to outer security.



This paper has been divided into two sections:

The first section is addressing the relation between China and ASEAN states considering the South China Sea. The second section is about China's strategic thinking regarding the South China Sea, which elaborates the objectives and settings for China's line of attack.

Background of Discussion

This study lacks being guided through a new or rather formal approach regarding conflict management mechanism, which may have been employed to avoid an increase in conflict situation and to promote diplomatic interactions among nations residing along the South China Sea. An informal conflict management refers to the communication among potential combatants to be effective enough to account for the pertaining issues. For example, the conflict within ASEAN and China and its consequential situations has limited the concerned parties to play a significant facilitating role. ASEAN can take considerable steps to prove its due value to the provincial peace and safety by taking significant actions to promote peace in the region and decrease the rate of conflicts. It has currently provided a few informal methods to communicate with its members. However, this may be aimed at optimizing the methods so as to deal with the current issues (Imran, et al., 2015, pp. 1-17).

Historical exploration has demonstrated that peaceful conflict resolution is helped by creative and easygoing techniques. Under the Aquino administration, the Philippines' administration's harder disposition towards China concerning the South China Sea debate is undermining the sensitive political harmony between the two nations and debilitates endeavors to determine question. Spectators wonder whether the "Aquino way" will be more compelling than the "ASEAN Way" as far as determining question. On the other hand, it ought to be noticed that some ASEAN members are not content with the Aquino approach (Pablo-Baviera, 2012, pp. 13-23 & Pratama, et al., 2019)). Some observers have addressed the concerns about the possibility of dispatching Chinese fishing boats to other countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), where the rival claimants' jurisdiction is settled, is a deliberately arranged activity with respect to the Chinese government (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2012 April 23). At the point when ASEAN ships pulled back from the debated waters by ASEAN implicitly recognized China's power over the shoals. Holmes (2012 Sep 17) has pointed out that China will practice the same strategic activities towards other inquirers' EEZs. Thus, the following move from the Chinese government will be firmly viewed by the people of China and different nations connected with Scarborough Shoal Standoff (Buszynski, 2012. p, 108).

Moreover, the rule of "critical date" is also deemed as a crucial issue which is normally considered as the actual time when the dispute takes place (Barker, 2002). It is described as "the date after which the actions of the parties can no longer affect the issue". Tanaka has also observed the significance of the date when the dispute was developed within the context of a territorial dispute. The judgment regarding the authority, between Indonesia and Malaysia over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipidan in 2002 (Sakai, 2011; Beckman, 2011, 14-31), is an example which illustrates that "the court cannot address the acts which had taken place after the critical date"(Tanaka, 2008, p.1-15). In 2009, the Philippines announced its sovereignty over these disputed territories. Zhang



studied the claims of sovereignty made by Vietnam over the same territories. The international law provides that the policy of estoppel limits the authority of someone to claim or deny the mentioned acts, accusations or renunciations. Hence, when China declared authority over the territorial waters in 4 September 1958, Pham Van Dong, Vietnam's prime minister issued a letter in which he supported the declaration of China to his Chinese colleague Zhou En Lai. Zhong Sheng (2012 May 9), a writer for the People Daily, provided that as per international law, China's sovereignty claims over the Scarborough Shoal are valid. Researchers including Jin Yong Ming (2012, June 2), director of the International Law Research Center at the Shanghai branch of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences defended Sheng's claims. This shows that China acknowledges the potential regarding the occurrence of sovereignty issues in the South China Sea which are prone to be judged as per international law in the future. That is why, China has fortified the validity of its claims while evaluating the irregularity of opposite claimants of the territories (Torode, 2012 May 17).

ASEAN and China Relations in the South China Sea, 1992-2014

In July 1992, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) started to focus on this issue after the rise in the conflict between China and Vietnam over discovery of oil in the region. ASEAN gave out a statement that advised unspecified parties “to exercise restraint.”¹ Both countries ignored the declaration and tried to occupy the islands and banks including the Spratly archipelago close to the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.

Another Spratly-related controversy was ignited by China in late 1994 when it captured the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef. This controversy turned out as a significant point in the story. At that moment, serious concerns were raised by the ASEAN foreign minister and he advised the related states to refrain from taking actions that de-stabilize the situation.² The Philippines promoted its associated states to accept a Code of Conduct (COC) that would restrict China from more violation. Almost five years were taken by ASEAN to urge the member states to come to an agreement on a draft ASEAN COC. China had drafted its own COC by that time.

In March 2000, ASEAN and China came to an agreement to swap their own drafts and to combine them to make an effective draft for the future, but after two years, it became obvious that it is impossible to reach an agreement in this regard. What follows next are the areas of differences:

- Geographic scope
- Limitations on construction on occupied and unoccupied geographies
- Military actions in waters near the Spratly islands
- Guidelines regarding detainment of fisherman found in undecided waters

¹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea,” July 22, 1992. <http://www.aseansec.org/1196.htm>.

² Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” Point 10, November 4, 2002. <http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm>



In November 2002, as a compromise, ASEAN part states and China marked a non-binding political articulation known as the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). This report set out four trust and certainty building measures and five intentional agreeable exercises. Altogether, the gatherings reaffirmed “that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.”³

It took another quarter of a century before ASEAN and Chinese senior authorities came to concurrence on the terms of reference for a Joint ASEAN-China Working Group (JWG) to execute the DOC. At the early meeting of the JWG in August 2005, ASEAN tabled draft Guidelines to Implement the DOC. Point two of the ASEAN draft, which called for ASEAN consultations prior to meeting with China, demonstrated such as staying point, to the point that it took six years of discontinuous dialogues and the exchange of twenty-one progressive drafts before the last agreement could meet China’s demanded then, as it does now, that sway and jurisdictional debate must be determined reciprocally by the gatherings specifically concerned.

In July 2011, the Guidelines to Implement the DOC were finally received after ASEAN dropped its emphasis on former counsels. ASEAN changed Point 2 as follows: “to promote dialogue and consultation among the parties.” A new indication, included the first ASEAN draft determining that exercises and projects carried out the DOC ought to be accounted for to the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting. In every single other admiration, the last rules were about verbatim to the first ASEAN draft tabled in 2005. In January 2012, ASEAN and Chinese senior authorities started dialogues in Beijing on the rules' execution. This meeting consented to build up four master boards of trustees on sea experimental examination, natural assurance, inquiry and salvage, and transnational wrongdoing. These councils were in light of four of the five helpful exercises included in the 2002 DOC.

It was concurred that ASEAN would continue all alone to draft a COC, while corresponding with China would happen through the ASEAN seat in the meantime. ASEAN's amazing achievement was immediately marred by the phenomenal meetings at the AMM Retreat held on the night of July (Carlyle, 2012, pp. 65-90). Cambodia's foreign minister Hor Nam Hong, as ASEAN chair, assigned the undertaking of drawing up the joint explanation on AMM discourses to a working group composed of the foreign ministers from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. At the point when the draft joint proclamation was tabled at the AMM Retreat, Cambodia protested the wording of two sections compressing examinations on the South China Sea. The draft said the Philippines' complaints to the sending of Chinese paramilitary vessels to Scarborough Shoal, and Vietnam's protests to China's declaration that it was renting oil obstructs that fell inside of Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone. Cambodia demanded that these were respective issues and ought not to be incorporated in AMM joint articulation (Nurdin, et al., 2015, pp.18-24).

ASEAN’s disarray proved temporary. In the midst of the recriminations that took after the AMM, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa started discussions with his ASEAN

³ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” Point 10, November 4, 2002. <http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm>



partners with an end goal to restore solidarity and submit ASEAN to a typical position on the South China Sea. Marty (as the foreign minister prefers to be called) directed an extraordinary round of transport tact traveling to five capitals (Manila, Hanoi, Bangkok, Phnom Penh and Singapore) over a two-day period (July 18–19). He and Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario met first and consented to a six-point recommendation that Marty put to his other ASEAN partners. After he got their agreement, Marty educated Cambodia's Hor Namhong and left it to him as ASEAN chair to complete the diplomatic formalities. On July 20, Hor Namhong formally discharged ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea. All ASEAN foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to:

1. The full implementation of the DOC.
2. Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC.
3. The early conclusion of a Regional COC in the South China Sea
4. Full respect of the universally recognized principles of international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
5. Continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties.
6. Peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law including the 1982 UNCLOS

It looks as if China is going on a “charm offensive” instead of a naval one. China has increased trade and is now a major trade partner of ASEAN. In accordance with the opinion of Ito (2010), China desires to uphold and increase this trade so it is exploiting a historical arrangement of normally peaceful relations amongst states whose seashores are splashed by the South China Sea. It is significant to increase such consultations and reach a solution so as to maintain an environment of peace. Possibly, the major development in this regard would be a collaborated navigation security. In case of fishing and war games, precaution should be taken in to account. Another way for China is to settle the issues with ASEAN states, especially with the emerging states, without any intention of controlling them. Moreover, ASEAN states should carefully make deals with their huge neighbour. They should make agreements in this regard rather than imposing those requirements. There must be readiness to cooperate with China on jointly helpful and advantageous projects.

China's Strategic Thinking about South China Sea

Two components ought to be noted, before talking about China's policy. By deciding to postpone its strategy, China has chosen not to seek a strategy of appreciation of seizing debated elements from different states or convincing them to forsake their own particular claims to oceanic rights. Rather, the system tries to solidify China's capacity to practice jurisdiction over the waters that it claims. Since the methodology looks to solidify China's claims, it debilitates the position of different states which is destabilizing. Predictable with the security's rationale issue, activities by



one state to combine its claim will be seen as debilitating by alternate petitioners, particularly when such activities are embraced by the strongest state in question.

Both inside and outside contemplations have molded China's strategic thinking in connection with the South China Sea in the post-Cold War time. At the conceptual level, China's existing strategic process regarding the South China Sea is, all things considered, affected by Deng Xiao-ping's Eight Principles of International Strategic Thinking, which have been utilized by Jiang Zemiri's third-era initiative as the premise for China's remote strategy in the post-Cold War time. Here, the first and most essential guideline is the subject of "peace and development". In 1984, Deng contended that the world was confronting two difficult issues, "peace and improvement" which had worldwide key ramifications for China. As indicated by Deng, the issue of "peace" was an overall issue standing up to the East and the West, though the issue of "advancement" was one between the rich North and the poor South. From Deng's viewpoint, dominions and power legislative issues played by the West against the East was the underlying driver of universal clashes between the two sides. In his view, the key clashes in Southeast Asia and in the South China Sea specifically, were the aftereffect of superpowers' quest for hegemonism and power politics issues (Swaine, 2011, pp. 1-15).

The quest for hegemonism by the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, were additionally mirrored in the contentions in Asia during the Cold War time. In this way, the contentions in the South China Sea in the middle of Beijing and Hanoi over the Paracel and the Spratly Islands in the 1970s and 1980s could be clarified from Beijing's point of view as having been a piece of Moscow's worldwide hegemonism stretched out toward the South China Sea in a joint effort with a "provincial hegemonist's" claim - that will be, that of Vietnam - over the Paracel and the Spratly Islands. In this way, China's key considering towards the South China Sea cannot be comprehended without connecting it to the bigger worldwide key goals of the superpowers. As needs be, China's existing key considering towards the South China Sea is profoundly established in Dong's global strategic thinking (Deng, 1987, p. 32-43).

At the provincial level, despite the fact that China now sees Russia and the United States as posturing less security dangers contrasted with the 1960s and the 1970s, the global vital environment keeps on staying unstable and confounded. In spite of the fact that the bipolar security structures exist no more, the international strategic environment is still in the process of transition, with no clear-cut security patterns having yet emerged. From Beijing's point of view, the post-Cold War period is still loaded with vulnerabilities, with the United States as the sole superpower as yet looking for "hegemony" and taking part in force legislative issues. China believes that a major world war is unlikely to occur in the near future, but local and regional armed conflicts are likely to be unavoidable.

Trade and ventures amongst China and Southeast Asia will improve due to China's quick economic development and the economic accomplishment of the ASEAN (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand). As a connection with the Southeast Asian states as far as exchange, speculations and correspondence is concerned, the South China Sea will consequently turn out to be strategically more essential to China. Recently, China's developing interests in the ocean can likewise be seen from its distinct fascination in solidifying ties with Myanmar. It was accounted



for that China had plans to build up navigational offices on Myanmar-controlled islands in the Bay of Bengal. Does the matter then imply that China's enthusiasm for the sea zones go past the South China Sea, to incorporate the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific? One expert proposes that Beijing has investigated the likelihood of sending a few destroyers, frigates and submarines (ballistic rocket submarines and torpedo assault sub-marines) to the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The main concern of China's policy in the last ten years has been to reach a friendly settlement with its competitors, the Spratlys over the South China Sea. The South China Sea offers a beneficial environment where China's plans and safety is involved while ridges like Vietnam can effortlessly be dominated by Beijing. China, to this point, instead of declaring their armed forces, has been acting in a reasonable manner, displaying great self-control and concentrating on political and diplomatic advantages. The serene stance of China is an essential method and also its intention, with the aim to focus on thriving its economy and the development of its armed forces (Singh, 1995.p, 67).

Obviously, Beijing claims how the services exist pertaining to peaceful functions - to offer urgent situation solutions to help China's own fishing and merchant fleets, vessels involving neighbouring countries along with other ships that sail across the south China and Taiwan Ocean. Indeed, Beijing keeps what would likely will be very good relations with its southern neighbours. Therefore, in the Boao Online community pertaining to Parts of Asia, an annual economic debate placed within China's Hainan province earlier this month, president Xi Jinping himself outlined out recommendations, inter alia, for a Maritime Silk Road that will link China to the Indian Ocean via the South China Sea. In addition, this year will hopefully be one of China and -ASEAN cooperation. The Silk Road proposal is to encourage a free flow of economic factors.

Beyond knowledge has shown of which China will only work with pressure if several conditions are present. First among these conditions is when Beijing perceives that its basic national interests are seriously challenged and threatened by its adversaries, such as over the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. The second reason is any time China perceives that its sovereignty as well as its internal security is usually threatened, seeing that seemed to be the case over the Tibetan Rebellion in 1959 and the Sino-Indian Warfare in 1962. Third, China uses pressure if it's adversaries do not consider its safety measures significantly, and this could cause conflict, seeming to be the case inside Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979 and the provided clashes having Vietnam above the territorial disputes in the Spratlys in March 1988 Recently, again, China threatened to use force against Taiwan during the Taiwanese presidential elections (Roy, 1994, p.69).

There happened to be some explanations nevertheless, according to which it can be concluded that China will not exercise its power in the near future against the Spratlys. First of all, technocrats eminently lead the politics of China while it is strengthening its status and do not desire any hurdles to be caused in their governance evolution from second to the fourth generation by a disagreement with Spratlys. The overseas investments were altered as the global impression of China was damaged by the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989, and Beijing has gained its lesson from that encounter. Thirdly, policy disputes will erupt in the Politburo of the CCP, significant damage would be the result of unpleasant terms between Sino-ASEAN that have perfectly been developed since 1971 by Beijing in case of equipped encounters with any of the ASEAN nations,



involving Vietnam (Kim, 1994, p. 88). On the other hand, the South China Sea is tactically situated in the middle of northern, southern, eastern and western ocean courses that are significant to the sea transportation. For instance, of all the oil tankers imported by Japan, 70 per cent sail through this part of the Sea. Hence, for prospective opponents like Japan and India, controlling the South China Sea can be very essential. On the contrary, the marine competence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific zone is not considered as an instant and average hazard by China towards its deliberated benefits in the South China Sea. But as China creates the PLAN to acquire an international competence in the twenty-first century, a conflict of Sino-U.S. oceanic concerns in the Pacific and Indian Oceans appear unavoidable. Hence, to achieve the position of international oceanic control, acquiring the South China Sea is a very significant initial phase (Beckman, 2012, pp. 14-31).

General Qian Lihua who was China's Office Director of National Defence Department Foreign Affairs met up and reviewed with his U.S. colleague in Beijing, David Sedney, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Defence for East Asia at that time (The White House, 2006). In the past, at the request of the ASEAN associates, the U.S. strode into the regional disagreements once, and China was offended after urging from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries, the American representatives began to protest. On behalf of the ASEAN Regional Forum, in Hanoi, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, acknowledged the independence of steering through the South China Sea in the "national interest" of the U.S. Further insisting on her announcement in 2002, she declared: "We support the associates to reach a contract on a code of conduct."

After the participation of Chinese ships in horrid and generally exposed events in Vietnamese and Philippine waters this year, Beijing nearly approved the strategies for its convenience, as it sought to encourage the ASEAN states. Disagreeing with them would have placed China at a political disadvantage. China, apparently, does not approve of ASEAN nations urging the U.S. to interfere for a second time. Even though the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi expressed that the Chinese "at an appropriate time", consent to the code of conduct, but the Southeast Asian representatives believe in the contrary. The just cannot bring themselves to be certain that Beijing had second thoughts. As a matter of fact, they completely anticipate that the application of the statement will be further delayed by China seeking for another alibi.

Conclusion

What has been addressed above validates that China's tactical planning regarding the military-strategic aspect concerning the South China Sea cannot be described in details but has to be understood in a universal span, which is not only associated with the national, political and financial deliberations but also with the local and global atmosphere. China's tactical strategies concentrated on the two superpowers that presented with the most danger throughout the Cold War era. Therefore, the strategies of China were propelled outwards. China in the post-Cold War era is tactical and its safety plans are aimed inwards due to the drastically transformed exterior atmosphere. This is centred on the interest of Beijing concerning its union with Hong Kong, its longing to test the nationalist feelings being projected outward in Taiwan, also its cultural protesters in Xinjiang province, Tibet and Mongolia. The unfavourable effects on the Muslims in Xinjiang of the rising Islamic fundamentalism in the Central Asian Muslim-dominated states are very



disturbing for Beijing. South China Sea in the Asia-Pacific region does not entertain a very significant position in the general planning and strategy creation in China's principles.

The tactical issue in the East China Sea is more significant and crucial than the South China Sea, from Beijing's point of view. The fresh political arguments among Tokyo and Beijing over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands are viewed as a prologue to a probable conflict in Sino-Japanese associations from the increasing nationalism among the Japanese. To China, the disagreements over the dominance in the South China Sea is not of prime importance and, if the superpowers like United States, Japan, Russia or India do not interfere, controllable even. China is expected, in the South China Sea, to obtain a balanced perspective, feasible and discreet plan, look for a position and discussion with the rest of the applicant nations on both two-sided and multi-sided foundation. Hence, in the Spratly disagreements, political and diplomatic possibilities instead of armed powers are favoured by China to deal with its opponents.

In the short and medium terms, that may be, in one or two decades, the scenario regarding the sovereignty quarrels is likely to be in the same position with neither conflict nor resolution except for occasional "hiccups". The actual Mischief Reef incident is an effective case in point, as China does not want to create more tensions over such disputes because it prefers to place priority on its economic relations with the ASEAN states.

Over the Spratlys, China will persist to be the most vital role in the dominance arguments. In the South China Sea, it will establish the manner, course and the sequence of advancement to certain amount. Even though, Beijing resists that reconciliation cannot be formed where the dominance issues are concerned, it is still likely that Beijing negotiates over these disagreements in future with the other applicant nations as it did with Myanmar, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Mongolia, and maybe with India, Russia and Vietnam in predictable future, as the dominance issues with Beijing are not as serious as they appear to be. But delicate matters regarding inter-state connections in a way where agreement and mandate can be attained among China and the Southeast Asian nations are still to be realized by Beijing. China's future goals regarding the South China Sea are still full of doubts for the Southeast Asian nations, specifically its sneaking yet forceful conduct. China will have to establish superior understanding in relation to the welfare and concerns of the Southeast Asia. The acknowledgement of the welfare of other nations will in return give China the type of exterior security it seeks which in turn will prove to be beneficial in its global connections.

References

- Bagus, B.T. (2013, April 9). ASEAN chief pushes RI to act on South China Sea dispute, The Jakarta Post.p. 9.
- Baviera, A,S (2012). The South China Sea Disputes: Is the Aquino Way the ASEAN Way? RSIS Commentaries. 7 (2), 13-23.



- Beckman, R. (2011). Island or Rocks? Evolving Dispute in South China Sea. *RSIS Commentaries*, 7 (5), 14-31.
- Bower, L. (2012). China Reveals Its Hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh,” *Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th and K Streets*, 3(14), 2.
- Buszynski, L. (2012). *The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S- China Strategic. Code of Conduct. The South China Sea: Towards a Region of Peace, Security and Cooperation*, ed. Truong Thuy,T,Hanoi: The Gioi Commentaries .7 (5),104.
- Hongfang,S. (2010). China-Southeast Asian Economic Relations in the 21st Century: Evolving Features and Future Challenges. *International Journal of China Studies*. 1 (1), 25-45.
- Imran, M., Abdullah, L., Reevany Bustami, M. (2015). Evolution and Identity of the Kelantan Peranakan Chinese: Issues and Challenges. *International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding*. 2(1), 1-17. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18415/ijmmu.v2i1.8>.
- International Court of Justice (ICJ). (1998, 4 December). “Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada). Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and orders. Dec 4. *Studies*, 35, 139-156.
- Kastner, J. (2012, May 16). China’s fishermen charge enemy lines. *Asia Times*. p. 7.
- Lee,K.Y.(2001). *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965-2000*. Singapore: The Straits Times Press and Times Media, 2001, 663-668.
- Nuridin,B., Reevany Bustami,M. (2015). Food Culture, Food Security and the Harmonization of Interethnic Groups: A Case Study of Karta Village in the Transmigration Area of Lampung Province, Indonesia. *International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding*. 2 (1). 18-24. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18415/ijmmu.v2i1.9>.
- Pratama, R, I., Megadini, D, D., Kusriandini, Tanti (2019). Effect of Perceived Ease of Use, Word-of-Mouth Communication, and Brand Image on Decision to Use Lazada E-Commerce Services. *International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding*. 6(1).173-186. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18415/ijmmu.v6i1.533>.
- Shimada,Y., Hayashide, M.(2012).Chapter 12 Dispute settlement, *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*. 173.
- Tanaka, Y. (2011). Passing of Sovereignty: The Malaysia/Singapore Territorial dispute before the ICJ. *The Hague Justice Portal*. 1-15.
- Thuy, T. T. (2011). Recent Developments in the South China Sea: From Declaration to Code of Conduct, *The South China Sea: Towards a Region of Peace, Security and Cooperation*, ed. Tran Truong Thuy, Hanoi: The Gioi, 104.



Torode, G. (2012a, May 17). Actions Speak Louder than Words. South China Morning Post. p. 4.

Torres, E. (2012), July 13). Manila tack on China row wins Asean nod, Business Mirror. p. 21.

Torode, G. (2012, July 21). ASEAN Left on a Knife Edge, South China Morning Post. p. 8.

Copyrights

Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to the journal.

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).