



The Rationality of Institutional Structures

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Abstract

Rationality is one of the cornerstones of modernity and science, however, it has meant a lot of things over the thousands of years of human and social evolution. There was a time when even the word of God as interpreted by the Bible was considered rational. This idea has gone through considerable change even in modern times and this paper starts with the criticism of the modern idea of individual rationality and building on to the idea of society and how rational action results in the formation of social institutions and norms. Next the paper critically analyzes the challenges that the modern idea of rationality has already faced in the light of the development of post-modern approaches in social sciences. And lastly the paper concludes by constructing a ‘pure type’ idea of structured rationality which can be useful in institutional design and critical analysis of institutional failures.

Keywords: *Rationality, Weber, Bourdieu, Social Fields, Rational Choice*

Introduction

Without going into the idea of rationality as it had developed in ancient India, Egypt, Greece and other civilizations of antiquity, simply because it wasn't rationality as we understand it in the modern sense (Bronkhorst, 1999). We shall not be remiss if we assumed that the pre-cursor to all theories on rationality in the modern and contemporary times has been Weber's idea of Rationality and his description of rationality in terms of pure type constructs (Hekman, 1983). What really is rationality is a very complicated question, and there are multiple theories which define different kinds of rationality. Instead of defining rationality per se, it will be more appropriate to understand what sociologists use it for.

For social scientists, the most important question has been the understanding of the behavior of human beings in a social setting. In order to understand it, we categorize these behavioral patterns of humans and study them as social facts or social actions or *habitus*. Even more important is the understanding of what motivates such behavior, which results into such facts or acts (Farnell, 2000). This is where rationality appears, every human being behaves in a unique manner and that behavior is a direct

result of the choices made by the individual cognitive faculties of that particular person (Van Gelder *et al*, 2013). Before we discuss what determines this choice, and there have been multiple theories on it as well, let us first understand what rationality has to do with this choice.

If we dig any deeper into cognitive faculties it will take us into the realm of Psychology where we do not wish to venture, therefore we shall at this time just assume that every individual human being is endowed with some natural cognitive faculty which is unique to every individual and this is what defines their individuality (Rayner & Riding, 1997). This individuality means that the choice any human being makes in any given social setting will be unique to that individual. Even in the situation where multiple humans make the same choice, the reasons behind making that choice may be different for each individual. Even in the case where the reason for making a certain choice was the same for multiple humans, the factors that each considered in order to arrive at that decision to make that choice may be different (Simon, 1955). In fact, I have not come across any research so far that would claim that this uniqueness of choice could be predicted or governed based on any scientific principle or law.

From an individualistic point of view, every human in a situation where they have to make a choice, not only make the choice but also justify that choice with reasons, either to themselves or to others or both. Although these reasons are very subjective in nature, the idea of justification brings an aura of normativity to it. These norms of justification could be any type; legal, political, religious, moral and ethical or any other norm, which may be used by the individual to justify the reasons to make a certain choice (Bicchieri & Mercier, 2013). This normativity, however, brings in an external perspective to the individualistic subjective reasons that led to a certain choice. This external perspective is what describes rationality; if the reasons for the choice confirm to a certain norm it is a rational choice, if it does not then it is an irrational choiceⁱ (Elster, 1991).

When any individual makes a choice, they always find a justification to make that choice, and for that individual, the choice is always justified. It is only for others to decide whether that justification confirms to a certain norm or not. It must be clear from the above argument, that this normative exercise of others is also a very individualistic subjective exercise and it requires making a choice, whether or not the first choice confirmed to any norm. Therefore, the difficulty in defining rationality, which in itself is an individualistic subjective choice. This results in an infinite cyclical process with no beginning and no end making it impossible to define rationality in any scientific terms. What we can do is categorize rationality into pigeonholes, each pigeonhole typified by a social norm or a particular set of social norms. This also means that the exact same choice made by an individual may be rational in some societies and irrational in other societies, depending on the social norms acceptable in each societyⁱⁱ.

Social Force Fields

Consider the following analogy; assume that a physicist is trying to understand the behavior of any particle of some mass in some space and in this space the dimensions of this particle is that of a point. In accordance with the laws of physics that we understand so far, the behavior of this particle will depend on the forces acting on it. There may be single force acting on it or there may be multiple forces acting on it, and if there are multiple forces acting on it, the behavior of this particle will be determined by the resultant of all these forces, which is a vector summation of all individual forces acting on that particle. Without going into the details of particle physics and assuming that for the purpose of this analogy the unified field theory will hold true, the forces acting on this particle are a result of its interactions with other such particles occupying the same space (Skyrme, 1962).

In the same way if sociologists try to understand the behavior of a human being in any particular society, they would need to determine all the forces that act on that particular human being. These forces could be political, economic, religious, communal, tribal or any other type that we can logically conceive.

These forces result from the interactions of different human beings who occupy the same social space, and similar to the above analogy, these interactions are stronger when in that same social space; humans are in close proximity to each other. However, it is impossible to create a unified field theory in sociology to explain all such social interactions and forces because human beings are not elementary particles whose behaviors can be physically quantified (Burnes & Cooke, 2013).

In order to get around this problem let us assume that each of these social forces (political, economic, religious and so on...) create a kind of force field which exerts a certain influence over all human beings who happen to reside within its sphere of influence in any social space. In physical spaces and in simplified terms the force field can take the form of a bell or a well and particles can either bounce off the bell or fall into the well, this is why the behaviors of elementary particles can be easily quantified (Razavy, 2003). In social spaces however, social forces take multitude of complex forms and when humans are exposed to these complex force fields, they can behave in a multitude of ways, making it impossible to quantify human behavior. Nevertheless, this force field or sphere of influence of social forces prohibits or limits certain kinds of behavior and promotes certain other kinds, creating **norms** that describe the acceptable kind of behavior in any given social space (Burnes & Cooke, 2013).

Again, continuing with the same analogy, in physical space and as far as we can understand it and without any iota of doubt this understanding is very limited, there are only four kinds of force fields that exist and even the unified field theory cannot explain these four force fields completely (Skyrme, 1962). Similarly, in social space as well there are various kinds of social force fields that exist; political, religious, economic, legal, communal or human relational, tribal, bureaucratic, artistic, mass media and the like. The same way as in physics, unified field theory explains the existence of the force fields it only has a limited explanation of what causes these force fields to exist in the first place, in sociology as well, we know that these social forces exist and they exert a sphere of influence which we can call 'force field' but we can only partially explain the reasons behind the existence of these social force fields.

We can safely conclude that no social forces that exist in human society today exist *sui generis*. These social forces are the resultant of the socio-psychologicalⁱⁱⁱ force fields exerted by the individual humans who constitute a given social space and in some cases the socio-psychological force fields exerted by individuals who may be occupying other social spaces both temporally and spatially (Lewin, 2013). There are two basic differences between the physical force fields and the social force fields; *one* as we have already seen above the, the physical force fields can be quantified and their resultant effects calculated through the method of vector addition, social force fields cannot be quantified and therefore their effects cannot be calculated with any precision either, and *two* in social spaces human beings exert their own personal socio-psychological force field, which distorts the other social force fields creating a resultant field which not only cannot be calculated, but also affecting its effect on the behavior of other human beings occupying the same social space.

Coming back to rationality, we have already seen that it is an external perspective on the behavior of human beings in any social space. So, how do we understand the internal perspective of the human behavior or choice? The simple answer is we cannot; there is no way in which we can know what a human being had in mind when making a certain choice. Let us try however, to understand it with an example; a terrorist straps a bomb to his waist, goes into a crowded place and blows himself up killing himself and others as well. From any point of view, this is not a *normal* behavior, and if human beings were capable of making rational choice, why would anyone make such a patently irrational choice? There can be only two answers to this question; *one* the terrorist was incapable of making a rational choice, or *two* he was capable of making rational choice, but he consciously chose not to do so. In either of these cases, rationality is being imputed from an external perspective in hindsight, the terrorist however, made the choice to blow himself up simply because he made that choice. Since, we can never understand why he made that choice; let us call it 'justification'. If a human being can find a justification to make a certain

choice, they will make that choice, whether or not it is a rational choice will always be decided in hindsight from an external point of view (Elster, 1991).

The next question that arises then is, whether this justification of a particular choice made by an individual be externally influenced. In other words, can these force fields be altered or the spheres of influences limited or expanded in such a way to rationalize the decision-making processes in an organized setting (Simon, 1995)? As discussed above, we have no clue how many kinds of social forces exist and what their spheres of influences are, however, as we can see from the above figure, various force fields exist in completely random fashion in any given social space, the individuals that exist in this social space are also completely randomly placed and their individual socio-psychological force fields are also completely random in strength and influence. It is impossible to organise them in any given pattern of predictability and even more difficult to quantify their resultant or combined influences. However, over the few thousand years of shared human history, we have been able to identify some of the more prominent forces and the kind of influence they exert in any social space and we have further created institutions that are capable (to a certain extent) of limiting and expanding such spheres of influences. To suggest that these institutions were created by anything other than the interactions of these social forces would be oxymoronic. Therefore, these institutions are not universal in character; they take different shapes and forms in different social settings, temporally and spatially (Bowles *et al*, 2003). However, there is one thing common to all social institutions (religious, political, economic, legal and bureaucratic or any other kind) that exist anywhere and in any society; and that is the fact that these institutions channel (irrespective of time and space) certain specific social force fields or their resultant sphere of influence on to the social space in which they exist and therefore onto the individual humans who exist in that social space. This ability to channel specific social forces into specific social spaces creates the **norms** that exist in specific societies. *In other words, social force fields create social institutions to regulate their own spheres of influences thus creating norms that regulate the behaviour of individuals within that social space.*

Institutional Structures

These institutions have a definite structure; these structures may vary depending on the spatial and temporal location of the social space in which these institutions are created. Furthermore, the definite structures provide social scientists with an opportunity for quantification and replication. It needs to be clarified that individual humans no matter how intelligent or evolved, are incapable of creating institutions. Institutions are only created by the interaction of social forces in human societies and they always fulfil a purpose. In other words, institutions are not the result of human evolution; however, they are the by-product of the collective evolution of human societies. For example; a male and a female coming together, having sexual intercourse and producing a progeny is a biological phenomenon, however, a man and woman entering into a marriage, consummating the marriage and creating an heir is a social phenomenon. The result in both cases is the same; however, the institution of marriage was not created without a purpose. As discussed above, its purpose is to limit the sphere of influence of certain social forces and expand the influence of certain other social forces, channel them onto individual humans within the social space and **normalise** their behaviour. In order to achieve this, the institution of marriage was structured; *first* a specific set of acts determine whether or not a wedding can be performed, *second* another specific set of acts perform the wedding, *third* another specific set of acts ensure the consummation of the wedding, and *finally* another detailed set of acts relating to the birth of the child both before and after the birth. These detailed sets of acts determine the structure of the institution of marriage and regulate the behaviour of every individual member of the society, by channelling certain specific social forces. The structure of this institution determines what is **normal** and what is not. The institution creates a sub-space within the social space, where not all social forces can freely exert their spheres of influences; certain social forces are more prominent whilst others have been muted. Once the

wedding is performed and the institution of marriage comes into existence, the spheres of influence of economy, polity, and media are all largely muted, whilst the spheres of influences of religion and family become exceedingly prominent. The sphere of influence of law is very limited within the institution of marriage; however, the moment the sanctity of this institution is violated or disputed, the sphere of influence of law becomes the most prominent of all. The behaviour of every social actor within or without the institution of marriage is regulated by the internal **norms**, which the structure of the institution determines. These **norms** do not just create a limitation on the social acts but also the psychological and biological acts of the social actors.

So far we haven't ventured into the question of what is good or bad, ethical or moral and whether the behaviour that these social institutions regulate are morally and ethically right or not. The more important issue for this paper would be whether effecting a change in the structure of these institutions might be able to rationalise the resultant behaviour of social actors within the given social space. We shall not go into the question of morality or ethics even in the case of such rationalisation and that may be a topic for another paper, but shall restrict our enquiry here to only the structural rationalisation of these social institutions. In order to understand this we will continue to look at our example of the institution of marriage, and how it differs among the various societies in India.

For the Mohammedan community in India, the wedding is performed as a contract and is concluded by the signing of the wedding agreement between the man and the woman. A Muslim male in India is allowed to have three wives and any number of concubines. Until very recently he was allowed to divorce his wives by simply uttering the word "*talaq*" three times in her face. The women do not enjoy any such privileges. Therefore, the structure of the institution of marriage in the Muslim society in India creates more limitations on the behaviour of Muslim women than on the Muslim men. The sphere of influence of religion in this society, which is controlled exclusively by Muslim men potentially, outweighs every other social force field, which exists within this social space (Jones, 2010). Very recently, the government of India illegalised the practice of "*triple talaq*" providing more protection to Muslim women, and thus causing a structural change in the institution of marriage within the Mohammedan society in India^{iv}. More research needs to be conducted to find out what exactly has been the impact of this structural change in the institution, and more so how strong has the opposition to the political and legal force fields been from the prominent force field of religion in the institutional sub-space. However, one thing is clear that the legal field has the potential of overpowering all other social force fields when it comes to restructuring of the social institutions. Another instance of such overpowering is the legalisation of gay sex in India, even though it faced opposition from the political forces as well as the religious forces^v.

Amongst the Christians in India, wedding is performed as a sacred union. It cannot be broken once made. The institution of marriage is the foundation of the family and therefore the society and once made cannot be unmade except under certain exceptional circumstances^{vi}. The same is the case with the majority Hindu society, the institution of marriage for whom is sacrosanct, so much, so that the word *Divorce* cannot translate into Hindi or Sanskrit. However, despite extreme pressure from the religious forces and to some extent even political forces, in 1955 the Hindu Marriage Act, in 1961 the Dowry Prohibition Act were enacted, and again it restructured the institution of marriage (Halli & Mullal, 2016). The legal forces predominated the other social forces in order to effect change, but this did not mean that the Hindu society readily accepted these changes to the structure of marriage. Even today, there are cases of torture and homicide of women in the name of dowry. The sphere of influence of the legal field may have been predominant in restructuring the institution, but the religious field and the cultural field regained their dominant status even after the restructuring creating deviant forms of social practices, which have prevailed in this social space for more than half a century (Babu & Babu, 2011).

From the preceding analyses, we can safely draw two conclusions; *firstly*, of all the force fields that exist in any social space the legal field has the highest potential of predominance and *secondly* this

potential of predominance can be utilised in order to fundamentally restructure social institutions. Institutions develop organically within the societies; their evolution coincides with the evolution of the societies in which they exist, and the evolution of the socio-psychological force fields of the individual humans that constitute that society (Bowles *et al*, 2003). The potential of predominance of the legal field over all other social fields may provide us an opportunity to artificially alter the structure of social institutions but it cannot account for the impact that such artificial alteration may cause onto other social force fields and other social institutions. Furthermore, it cannot account for the ethicality or immorality of such alteration or its subsequent impacts.

Throughout human history, no one has ever been able to find a single example of a society that evolved as an egalitarian society. There has always been some form or other of dominator class(es) and dominated class(es) and the dominator class always determines the social forces that prevail in the social spaces and sub-spaces. The socio-psychological force fields of the dominator class predominate the resultant social force fields and therefore the structural evolution of the social institutions is always lopsided in favour of the dominator class. This kind of lop-sidedness also means that the social spaces in which these forces apply always remain unbalanced and hence continuously exist in a state of social strife (Bourdieu, 1983). Unlike physical spaces, social spaces are incapable of attaining any kind of equilibrium ever. However, in order to counter this state of unbalance from getting out of hand, the social institutions have a natural mechanism of justification of such domination. The predominating social forces channelized through these social institutions restrict or limit the sphere of influence of the socio-psychological force fields of the dominated class of individuals and regulates their behaviour into accepting the domination as justified^{vii}.

This justification even though externally produced by the social force fields channelized by the institution, provides an internalised determination of the choices that individuals make within the institutional sub-space and the social space as a whole. *In other words, these justifications are basis of the social norms that exist in any given social space and these social norms create the justifications for the dominant and exploitative social practices.* Justification even though externally produced, can be internalised by individuals to provide an excuse for a certain act, whether rational or irrational. Rationality, however as seen in the preceding sections, can only be imputed in hindsight from without. Justification, which is externally produced, and Rationality, which is externally imputed, are intertwined together. Social Force fields acting within any social space or any sub-space existing inside any social institution, upon interaction with any individual's socio-psychological force field produce a resultant force field, which will guide the individual to behave in a certain manner. This resultant force field is what forms the basis of **norms** in that social space and therefore provide the justification of certain kinds of acts and not for certain others. This also forms the underlying basis of what a rational act would be and what would not be. The resultant force field that guides the behaviour of individuals in the social space may not be the same for every individual human; however, it does have a pattern and the individual behaviour is guided in similar fashion. This results in multitudes of individuals behaving in a similar manner in similar situations, thus providing us with a social map for the hitherto undefined rational behaviour or Rationality.

In an institutionalised framework, we have already seen that the legal force field always preserves its chance of predominance of other force fields. Resulting thereby, into a potential for structurally rationalising the institution to channelize various force fields in such a manner that the norms and rationality of individual choice may be influenced. Such a potentiality has always existed irrespective of the spatial and temporal dimensions in social spaces and with the examples cited above, we have also seen, how such influence can be potentially realised^{viii}. In the preceding sentence, I have listed out two different kinds of rationality; *one* potential for structurally rationalising the institution, and *two* the rationality of individual choice, which can be so, influenced^{ix}. Norms, rational behaviour and institutions are all the result of the interaction of social and individual socio-psychological force fields within any given social space. *Inter alia*, there must be some rationality (or equally potential irrationality) in the

structure of the social institutions. Weber (1978) has dealt rationality of Individual choice in some detail through his pure type construct, but it is very clear his pure types are imputed upon the individual actors from an external perspective in hindsight. To establish predictability in human behaviour, there must be foresight. Rational Choice Theories and Public Choice Theories tried to introduce such foresight into the rationality of individual action and suggested that these actions can be predicted, because human decision making is based on self-interest or material interest or economic interest or community interest and so on and so forth, and therefore whatever choices individuals will make, they will make them based upon one or all of these interests in mind (Simon, 1955) (Ostrom, 1975). However, none of these theories claims to have a behavioural pattern predictability that could come remotely close to the behavioural pattern predictability in natural sciences. Reason behind this is that these various types of interests are just another name for the externally produced justification of the act, which is internalised by the actors^x. For the actor the act has been performed because it is justified for them personally, whether it was a rational act or an irrational act is for the society to determine based on the existing norms of the society.

Structural Functionalists like Parsons (1985) and Merton (1968) deal with the structure of the society, the institutions within it, and how this structure defines the function of each individual. Parsons talks in terms of the world, the individual's world and the normative world, which creates constraints. These constraints result in tensions, which need an effort to resolve (Procter, 1980). In other words, the structure of the society is such that it creates constraints on the individuals who are then forced to act in certain ways only (determining their functions), therefore creating tensions in the social world which require effort to resolve. Bourdieu (1983) on the other hand describes the society from the point of view of fields, which are composed of agents who are involved in a constant struggle to achieve the dominant position within the field. This struggle, which must exist in perpetuity, does not need any resolution instead; this strife to achieve the dominating position amongst social agents is what in a way defines our society. Bourdieu's field will not exist without this struggle to achieve the dominant pole, but where does this struggle come about? For example, the juridical field did not exist at the beginning of human society; it only comes into existence after someone acquired specific technical knowledge that put them in a position of dominance over the rest of the society. Once that dominance is established, the struggle to achieve that dominant position starts and the field is born (Bourdieu, 2004).

Structured Rationality

There must be something that establishes that dominant position and creates the space for the struggle to start; what is that? The interaction of the social force fields and the socio-psychological force fields within social spaces creates these positions of dominance. The socio-psychological force field of certain individuals after interacting with the existing social forces achieve a greater sphere of influence than others, in other words the vector addition of such forces results in a resultant force field which is stronger than others, thus creating positions of dominance. However once that position is achieved, how and why would anyone lose that position? Luhman's (1988) legal system works as a self-referencing, self-reproducing autopoietic system and the only way it interacts through its environment is through irritations. These irritations keep the system grounded in human society and keeps the system working on itself through the logic of legality and illegality. In order to remain autopoietic, the system must take into account the irritations that it receives from the environment and continuously adjust its position with respect to the dialogic of legality and illegality. Once this position of legality and illegality shifts, the position of dominance that someone may have held within the Bourdieusian legal field shift as well. No matter which social theory we look at, it is always the interactions of the social force fields, the individual socio-psychological force fields and their resultants that create the irritations in Luhman's legal system, the position of dominance and struggle in Bourdieu's field and the constraints, tension and effort in Parsons' structure of social actions.

However, what each of these theories fails to take into account is that while these interacting social forces form the basis of rational or irrational human behaviour, these same interactions of the social forces result in the rationality or irrationality of the structures of the social institutions. Institutions obviously are composed of individual humans; however, they have a mind of their own, and the choices and decisions made by these institutions are similarly justified as individual decisions and similarly rational or irrational as individual choices. The rationality/irrationality of the institutional decisions therefore, depend on the resultant effect of social forces effective within the given social space. However, the institutional decisions themselves are the resultant of the social forces channelized by the institutional structure onto the institutional sub-space. Again, the institutional structure itself is the resultant of the interacting social forces within any social space and therefore whether or not this structure is rational is the resultant of the same interacting forces.

As already discussed, rationality, is imputed in hindsight from an external perspective, which means that the structure of the institution is what it is, whether or not it is rational is to be determined by others in the social space in which the institution exists, which again is the resultant of the interacting social forces within that space. This also means that the rationality of the institutional structure is never set in stone, but is a dynamic concept, which is dependent on the spatially and temporally evolving social spaces. Of the social forces, which determine the institutional structure the potential of predominance of the legal force field, is the highest and any structural changes to the institution is affected, through potential enlargement of the legal force field^{xi}. We have seen previously that in any social space, there are dominator classes and dominated classes, and the socio-psychological sphere of influence of the individuals in the dominator class(es) is always larger than that of those in the dominated class(es). Therefore, these dominator classes also predominantly determine what is rational and what is irrational in the given social space^{xii}. Any changes, can only be affected, when, either the collective effect of the socio-psychological spheres of influence of the dominator classes disintegrates or the collective effect of the socio-psychological spheres of influence of the dominated classes expands enough to predominate the definition of rationality within the given social space.

The concurrent effect of either of the situations described above is the spontaneous expansion of the sphere of influence of the legal force fields in that social space, and if in either of these situations the structure of the institution is found to be irrational, there is a compulsive move to restructure the institution to rationalise it in accordance with the newly formed definition of rationality in that social space^{xiii}. Political movements, religious movements or other kinds of social movements create the background for such wholesale changes in the spheres of influences of various social forces acting within any social space. Even the slightest changes in any of these spheres of influence will create an irritation in Luhman's legal system or a tension in Parsons' world. The legal system will readjust itself in accordance to the new dialogic of legality and illegality, Parsons' world will put in some effort to resolve the tension, in in our conception of the social spaces, the legal force field will predominate until it restructures the social institutions so that they adhere to the new definition of rationality as created by the resultant of interaction of the social force fields in that social space.

In conclusion, there has always been and there shall always be a potential of restructuring the social institutions to rationalise them, simply because the definition of rationality and the structure of the social institutions are both determined by the interaction of the same social forces in the same social space. If one is out of tune with the other, the spheres of influence of the social forces will automatically so align to bring the two in harmony with each other. Leaders, social reformers, academics, religious leaders have all used this same potential of predominance of social forces to effect such social changes for centuries and there will always remain a similar potential for restructuring of the social institutions to adhere to the continuously evolving definition of rationality in all spatially and temporally distinct social spaces.

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ⁱ It is an attempt to describe rationality in a different way than the pure type constructs that Weber created. It is an attempt to bring together the *homo economicus* & *homo sociologicus* and explain how the pure types are just a transient form of rationality which is organic in character and keeps evolving.

ⁱⁱ A very good example of this may be cited from India's freedom movement against the British Colonial Rulers. In 1929, Bhagat Singh threw two country made bombs into the Central Legislative Assembly (now Parliament) in Delhi, the bombs were harmless and no one was hurt. For the people of India Bhagat Singh is a Martyr freedom fighter for the British he was a terrorist. For the Indian people his act was perfectly **normal** but for the British it was illegal and unethical for which he was prosecuted.

ⁱⁱⁱ The reason I do not use the term psychological force fields is that it does not exist. Human psychology will not exist on its own without a society. Therefore, these force fields are always socio-psychological.

^{iv} <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49160818>

^v <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-45429664>

^{vi} https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/3965/1/Christian_Marriage_and_Divorce_Act_1957.pdf

^{vii} The discourse in this paper is heavily influenced by the conception of fields by Bourdieu and the topology of forces by Kurt Lewin; however, I refrain from using both these terms in their original context and therefore, instead of using the terms 'fields' or 'forces' in isolation, I choose to use the term force fields and deal with their spheres of influence in social spaces and social institutions. In Bourdieu's field, the agents are engaged in a constant struggle to attain the dominant pole within the field. The reason behind these struggles are the socio-psychological forces that individuals within a given social space exert over the resultant social forces that have a sphere of influence within that social space. Moreover, in most cases these struggles rather than that of achieving the dominant position within the field, is that of simply existing in the field. In Indian society, a divorce rate is one of the lowest in the world because it is still considered an unethical and immoral proposition; the social forces accentuated by the institution of marriage so comprehensively overwhelm the socio-psychological sphere of influence of individuals inside a marriage that they accept an exploitative relationship in order to simply continue their existence within that social space. This is particularly true for the females within the marriage as generally, they are the dominated and the males are the dominators. One of the biggest reasons that women in India accept such servitude in perpetuity, is because the social forces channelized through the institution of marriage create a fear of excommunication and ostracization and restrict the sphere of influence of the woman's own socio-psychological force fields (in simpler words brainwash her into servitude).

^{viii} It is again immaterial whether such influence brings a positive or negative/good or bad change to social norms as questions of ethics and morality are beyond the scope of this paper and these questions again are always relative to the social spaces being dealt with.

^{ix} Both being the resultant effect of the interaction of social force fields and individual socio-psychological force fields operating within a social space.

^x It has already been explained previously that these justifications as all other terms described in this paper are a result of the interactions of the social force fields with the individual socio-psychological force fields.

^{xi} Other social forces like political, economic or religious forces have a potential of predominance as well and may effect similar structural changes to institutions however, even in those cases in modern societies, the legitimation of such structural changes can only come from the legal force field. In traditional societies, dogmatic legitimation may have been a possibility but in modern society, only acceptable legitimation comes from the legal forces.

^{xii} The sphere of influence of a nondescript human being is negligible, however by some turn of fate if that person becomes the leader of a nation their sphere of influence multiplies infinitely. Similarly the sphere of influence of



Marx or Weber was limited when they started their careers, but once they became classics their spheres of influence has multiplied manifold.

^{xiii} The examples cited above of the abolition of *triple talaq* or the legalization of same sex marriages or dowry prohibition were all the result of the same process as described here.

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