



The Influence of Papua's Armed Criminal Group in Indonesia's Political Legal System on Indonesia's Geostrategy

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Abstract

The conflict in the Papua region involving the Indonesian government and the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) is still unresolved. According to several opinions, the root causes of the conflict include discrimination, racism, unequal development, human rights violations and political status. Even the conflict in Papua has also become a world concern. Especially those related to human rights issues. Even though the content is the same, it seems that local media and international media frame and construct the conflict in Papua in different ways. This is motivated by various interests in the midst of the conflict. Media has the function of information (information) and influence (influence) in the framework of forming public opinion. On April 27 2021, the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security, Moh. Mahfud MD. in Press Release No.72/ SP/ HM.01.02/ POLHUKAM/ 4/ 2021 emphasized that organizations and people in Papua who commit massive violence are categorized as terrorists. Determination of the terrorist status of the KKB in the armed conflict in Papua certainly does not merely change status, but this determination certainly brings consequences when viewed from the perspective of Indonesian criminal law, both material criminal law and formal criminal law. The handling of the Papua conflict against the OPM separatist movement through military operations is regrettable by many parties because this effort has sparked generations of violence and grudges from the Papuan people against the Indonesian government. Strategic steps to resolve the Papuan issue include: a) strengthening the paradigm change oriented towards justice and prosperity with all its derivatives; b) accelerate the improvement of the quality of human life; c) provide access and opportunities to take part in a wide range of activities for the people of Papua; d) creating social engagement for all elements in Papua; e) strengthening equal law enforcement for all people; f) involving more Papuan people in making important decisions or policies for them; g) recognition of customary rights and freedom of expression of those rights; h) maximum protection of human rights; i) form a special envoy responsible for bridging the interests of all elements that play a role in the land of Papua; and j) strengthening dialogue networks with various groups with an interest in improving the lives of the Papuan people, both inside and outside the country.

Keywords: *Armed Criminal Groups; Indonesian Legal Political System; Papua*

Introduction

Indonesia's geopolitical and geostrategic development is growing rapidly. This is in line with the developing political and legal systems and access to increasingly advanced information. The legal political system in Indonesia is currently transforming rapidly which is marked by armed conflicts in the Indonesian Region. Separatism and idealism movements emerged that wanted to divide a nation. This movement on behalf of inter-ethnic groups through approaches that are coercive and result in loss of life and property to be able to join in situations and conditions. The current condition in Indonesia is not good, where there is an Armed Criminal Group (KKB) which is causing damage and creating a sense of fear for the people of Papua.

The conflict in the Papua region involving the Indonesian government and the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) is still unresolved. According to several opinions, the root causes of the conflict include discrimination, racism, unequal development, human rights violations and political status. Even the conflict in Papua has also become a world concern. Especially those related to human rights issues. Even though the content is the same, it seems that local media and international media frame and construct the conflict in Papua in different ways. This is motivated by various interests in the midst of the conflict. Media has the function of information (information) and influence (influence) in the framework of forming public opinion (Rozano Zarwan et al., 2022).

In the case of the conflict in Papua, each newspaper presents its own version of the story. The news presented is not the real reality because the news goes through a selection process. What is raised by the media through the news will show an emphasis on one particular aspect, and also disguise something that is not wanted by the media. This is possible because media owners and practitioners who have different backgrounds and socio-political environments become participants in the discourse, even their position can color or influence the participation of others. The power of the media in forming messages or developing discourse is influenced by the characteristics of media organizations and the work of the professionals involved in them (Edon & Hidayat, 2021).

External barriers generally stem from the aspect of commercial or political interests. Meanwhile, the internal obstacles relate to the routine performance of the media practitioners themselves, such as in the field of organization or regarding media communicators, which influences the process of media production, namely ideology. Discourse that has been formed in the mass media has a very important impact on the process of developing ideology in society, so that the results of ideological development will affect at the level of aspects of interest both from within the mass media itself and from outside. To find out the construction of the media about the multidimensional conflict in Papua, the media studied, namely Kompas in Jakarta, and the New York Times in New York, USA (Effendi & Panjaitan, 2021).

The Minister of Home Affairs (Mendagri) Tito Karnavian asked the Mimika Regional Government (Pemda) to facilitate hundreds of residents of the Tembagapura District who wanted to flee to Timika, Papua following the terror acts of the Armed Criminal Group (KKB). Tito Karnavian said that his party had communicated with the Mimika Regent Eltinus Omaleng to help refugees go to Timika. Not only that, Tito Karnavian asked the Mimika Regional Government to establish communication with respected local figures so they could have a dialogue with the KKB. The Regional Government (Mimika) asked to communicate with respected traditional tribal chiefs there, both religious and traditional leaders, youth leaders, women leaders questioning the Armed Criminal Group (KKB).

Based on its history, acts of violence committed by groups of people in Papua have received different names, the Police call it the Armed Criminal Group (KKB), the Indonesian National Army uses the term Armed Separatist Group (KSB), the Free Papua Organization (OPM), these groups are fighters who want to secede from Indonesia. Various attacks by the KKB or also known as KSB or also known as

OPM against law enforcement officers assigned to Papua, have forced the government to firmly stipulate the actions of groups committing violence in Papua as criminal acts of terrorism.

On April 27 2021, the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security, Moh. Mahfud MD. in Press Release No.72/ SP/ HM.01.02/ POLHUKAM/4/2021 emphasized that organizations and people in Papua who commit mass violence are categorized as terrorists (KemenkoPolhukam, 2021). The reason for the designation of organizations and people in Papua, which the government initially often referred to as the Armed Criminal Group (KKB)/Armed Separatist Group (KSB) as terrorists, was because they were deemed to have fulfilled the elements of a terrorist crime as referred to in Law Number 5 2018 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism.

Historically, before being labeled as terrorists, acts of violence committed by groups of people in Papua received different names, depending on who made the statement. (TNI) uses the term Armed Separatist Group (KSB), the designation of the word separatist which means the desire to separate from the Republic of Indonesia, so that it becomes one of the responsibilities of the TNI (Edon & Hidayat, 2021).

The origin of the KKB carrying out its actions in Papua cannot be separated from the history of Papua's joining as part of the Republic of Indonesia. The existence of Papua as part of the Republic of Indonesia is as long as Indonesia's struggle for independence. At the Meeting of the Investigative Body for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) July 10 and 11, 1945, the certainty status of Papua as part of the Republic of Indonesia became a long debate. Soekarno and Moh. Yamin is of the opinion that Papua must become part of the Republic of Indonesia because from a historical point of view Papua is part of the Majapahit kingdom. This opinion was rejected by Moh. Hatta, according to an ethnographic view, the Papuan people are Melanesians, not Polynesians who inhabit most of Indonesia's territory, so the decision to make Papua part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia or not should be left to the Papuans themselves (Mukhtadi, 2021).

Papua is a region that is still being targeted by the Dutch, even after the recognition of sovereignty on December 27, 1949. The Netherlands surrendered sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia, but not the Papua region. The Netherlands even prepared freedom for the Papuan people to determine their own destiny by pushing for preparations for tools and symbols of the completeness of the new state to be called West Papua. On December 1, 1961, the Morning Star as the national flag of West Papua was hoisted parallel to the Dutch flag, and the national anthem Hai Tanahku Papua was sung in front of the Dutch royal crown. (Mukhtadi, 2021). This effort was responded by the Republic of Indonesia with the operation to liberate West Irian which ended with the New York Agreement.

Papua is the only territory in Indonesia that is back to being part of the Republic of Indonesia through the New York Agreement signed by the Netherlands and Indonesia on August 15, 1962. The agreement was recorded by the UN General Assembly based on Resolution 1752 (XVII) on September 21, 1962. Jealousy social, neglected development, exploitation of natural resources on a large scale whose results are not enjoyed by the region itself supported by the domination of immigrants and considering indigenous people as second-class residents, making OPM increasingly receive support and sympathy from those who initially rejected it (Sefriani, 2003). Indigenous Papuans assume that the Indonesian government is turning its back on the development of the welfare and economic development of the Papuan people. The inability of the state to balance political policies against the interests of the Papuan people formed OPM as an effort to demand equality, independence, human rights in the Papua region (Mardiani et al., 2021). OPM thinks that they are fighting, but for the government their actions are classified as a separatist movement because they want to separate themselves from Indonesia by committing a crime and the government labels the group as KKB/KSB.

Various approaches have been taken by the government to resolve conflicts that have occurred for years in Papua. Among the ways or approaches taken by the government is by way of regional expansion based on Law Number 45 of 1999 concerning the expansion of Irian Jaya to become Central Irian Jaya Province and West Irian Jaya Province. The ratification of Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua which was amended twice to Law Number 35 of 2008 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2008 concerning Amendments to Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua Province Becomes Law and amended again by Law Number 2 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua Province. However, this approach was also accompanied by various kinds of military operations carried out to crush the OPM separatist movement, which became known as the KKB/KSB which did not make things better, instead the violence and efforts to leave the Republic of Indonesia grew stronger.

The various attacks carried out by the KKB against law enforcement officers on duty in Papua have forced the government to strictly designate acts or groups that commit violence in Papua as criminal acts of terrorism, thus the long history of the separatist movement in Papua by the OPM changed its status to no longer being treason but turned into terrorism. Based on this description, there are two problems that will be described, namely: is it appropriate to determine the terrorist status of the KKB in the armed conflict that occurred in Papua. Consequences of establishing terrorist status against the KKB in the armed conflict that occurred in Papua according to Indonesian Criminal Law.

Research Method

The research used in this research process uses a type of normative legal research (Soekanto & Mamudji, 2015). By using library materials or secondary materials that have been collected. Legal research is also a process to determine legal rules, legal principles, and legal doctrines in order to answer the legal issues faced.

Result and Discussion

1. Status and Position of Terrorists in Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) in the Armed Conflict in Papua in the Legal Political Constellation in Indonesia

In the initial discussion, it will be discussed first, is it right for the government to designate the KKB as a terrorist in the armed conflict in Papua. To answer right and wrong, we need criteria that can be measured and are objective. Because the government through the Menkopolkam uses the criteria of Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, this study also uses the same statutory approach coupled with a conceptual and case approach.

The history of legal regulation in Indonesia regarding terrorist crimes is regulated in Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu) Number 1 of 2002 after the Bali Bombing 1 dated 12 October 2002. These provisions are used to ensnare the perpetrators where the provisions in the Criminal Code cannot be used as legal basis to ensnare terrorist perpetrators and provide legal protection to victims. Perpu Number 1 of 2002 was then passed into Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, Becomes Law, and amended by Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism to become Laws (hereinafter referred to as the Law on Combating Terrorism).

According to Article 1 point 2 of the Law on the Eradication of Terrorism, "Terrorism is an act that uses violence or threats of violence that creates an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear, which can cause mass casualties, and/or cause damage or destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities with ideological, political or security disturbance motives. Based on this understanding, the elements of criminal acts of terrorism are: a) acts of violence or threats of violence; b) creates an atmosphere of terror or fear; c) widely; d) can cause mass casualties, and/or cause damage or destruction; e) to strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities or international facilities; f) carried out with ideological, political or security disturbance motives.

Acts of violence or threats of violence can be seen directly in the words of Article 1 point 3 and point 4 which read, "Violence is any act of abuse of physical force with or without the use of means unlawfully and causing harm to the body, life and independence of people, including making people faint or helpless". Threats of violence are translated as, "any unlawful act in the form of speech, writing, pictures, symbols or body movements, either with or without the use of means in electronic or non-electronic form which can cause fear of people in general or curb the essential freedom of a person or public". This element does not require a broad interpretation because its meaning has been authentically given in the law.

The next element is creating an atmosphere of terror or fear. The word terror comes from the Latin, *terrere* which can be interpreted as an activity or action that can create a sense of fear in society (Komariah, 2017). This element is also added with the word broad, which means that fear or an atmosphere of fear occurs not only for one or two people, but in a wider condition or an area. The next element is a complementary element because there is the word "can" related to the resulting impact or result, namely mass casualties, and/or causing damage or destruction. It is referred to as a complementary element because it does not require a real impact, because even in the form of a threat of violence, even though the real action has not occurred it can be categorized as a criminal act of terrorism.

The elements of the object targeted in the crime of terrorism are strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities or international facilities. Even this strategic vital object has been mentioned in a limited manner in Article 1 point 7 and 8 of the Law on the Eradication of Terrorism. According to Article 1 point 7, "Strategic vital objects are areas, places, locations, buildings or installations which: a) concern the livelihoods of many people, the dignity of the nation; b) is a source of State revenue that has political, economic, social and cultural values; or c) related to defense and security which is very high".

Public facilities are translated as places that are used for the benefit of the general public by Article 1 point 8 of the Law on the Eradication of Terrorism. All the elements have been described, only one last element which is very decisive in acts of terrorism, namely the motive for action is limitedly regulated for three things, namely: ideological, political or security disturbance motives. That all forms of acts of violence or threats of violence committed against these strategic vital objects must be carried out based on ideological, political or security disturbance motives. These three motives are then confused with political crimes, especially in Article 5 of the Law on the Eradication of Terrorism it states, "Criminal acts of terrorism regulated in this law must be considered not political crimes, and can be extradited or requested for mutual assistance as stipulated in the provisions of the legislation".

Based on the wording of the provision, even though it has ideological and political motives, terrorism cannot be considered a political crime. According to Barda Nawawi Arif as quoted in Dian Rahadian's research, so far there has not been an act that formally qualifies as a political crime. Political crime is not a juridical term, but only a general term and a scientific theoretical term. Political crimes are interpreted very broadly into several forms, namely: a) crimes against the state and state security; b)

crimes against the political system; c) crimes against the power system; d) crimes against basic values or basic rights in the state; e) crimes that contain political elements; f) crimes to gain/ maintain/ drop power; g) crimes against political institutions; h) crimes by the State; and i) the crime of abuse of power (Rahadian & Jaya, 2014).

Rio Armanda Agustian stated more concretely in his research, that one of the political crimes is contained in Chapter I of the Second Book of the Criminal Code, the Chapter on Crimes against state security which is contained in Articles 104 to 129 of the Criminal Code (Agustian, 2011). Political crimes listed in Chapter I of Book Two of the Criminal Code include: a) treason against the President and Vice President; b) treason against the territory of the state; c) plot to overthrow power; d) rebellion; e) conspiracy to commit the crime mentioned above; f) contact with foreign countries for hostility and war; g) contact with persons and entities outside Indonesia to overthrow the government; h) submit state secrets; i) entering prohibited military buildings and areas; j) make and collect pictures or instructions related to the military; k) endanger the neutrality of the State; and l) assisting the enemy. Separatism is a movement that wants to separate itself from a certain country. This separatist movement does not always use violence as a weapon, but not a few of these movements commit cruel crimes. A type of separatist movement that was successful in Indonesia was the case of East Timor because it was able to materialize the right for self-determination.

Separatist movements or rebellions demanding separation from Indonesian territory can be categorized as crimes against state security. In his research, Koes Dirgantara stated that OPM was the perpetrator of the rebellion (Mulia et al., 2020) as stipulated in Article 108 of the Criminal Code which reads, "(1) Whoever is guilty of rebellion, is punishable by a maximum imprisonment of fifteen years: 1. A person who opposes the Government of Indonesia with a weapon; 2. People who with the intention of opposing the Government of Indonesia join together or join forces against the government with weapons.

Based on the understanding between the two, the KKB has a very clear history stemming from the intention to separate itself from Indonesia, therefore the organization or group is named the Free Papua Organization (OPM) or also known as the Armed Separatist Group (KSB). Determination of the terrorist status of the KKB by the government is certainly inversely proportional to the KKB's status as a separatist organization. The attacks carried out by the KKB were not against strategic vital objects, but were carried out against officials such as members of the TNI and the Police who were part of the government as meant in the crime of rebellion. In addition, the KKB movement was not carried out secretly or in secret. Apart from carrying out physical attacks, OPM also continues to fight for the right to self-determination by trying to attract the world's attention and support.

Criminalization has been carried out by the government by giving the label terrorism to the KKB. The crimes committed have actually been regulated in Chapter I of Book Two of the Criminal Code, specifically as crimes of treason and rebellion. The government did not explain why the article was not used *lex specialis*. The designation of the KKB in the armed conflict in Papua as a terrorist group is inappropriate because of the historical background of the violence perpetrated by the KKB, as well as the fulfillment of the elements contained in the Law on the Eradication of Terrorism.

Even though the motive for what KKB did was political, the purpose of carrying out violence or threats of violence was not to create an atmosphere of terror or fear, but to break away from Indonesia, so that it would be more appropriate if KKB were perpetrators of political crimes as stipulated in Chapter I of Book Two Criminal Code. In addition, the determination of the terrorist status is not a solution to resolve the conflict in Papua because the determination of the status does not only have consequences for the qualifications of the crimes committed, but also related to the model of law enforcement carried out against the KKB.

2. Legal and Political Consequences of Indonesia's Geostrategy in Determining Terrorist Status Against Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) in the Armed Conflicts that Occurred in Papua

Determination of the terrorist status of the KKB in the armed conflict in Papua certainly does not merely change status, but this determination certainly brings consequences when viewed from the perspective of Indonesian criminal law, both material criminal law and formal criminal law. Based on the practices carried out so far, the criminal acts committed by the KKB have received both preventive and repressive responses from the Indonesian government. Several efforts to overcome the conflict in Papua have been made by the government, especially with the development approach model by continuing to improve the conditions of security and public order which are supported by development in all aspects of life.

Strategic steps to resolve the Papuan issue include: a) strengthening the paradigm change oriented towards justice and prosperity with all its derivatives; b) accelerate the improvement of the quality of human life; c) provide access and opportunities to take part in a wide range of activities for the people of Papua; d) creating social engagement for all elements in Papua; e) strengthening equal law enforcement for all people; f) involving more Papuan people in making important decisions or policies for them; g) recognition of customary rights and freedom of expression of those rights; h) maximum protection of human rights; i) form a special envoy responsible for bridging the interests of all elements that play a role in the land of Papua; and j) strengthening dialogue networks with various groups with an interest in improving the lives of the Papuan people, both inside and outside the country (Sianturi et al., 2020).

The political will of the Indonesian government to seriously handle the Papua conflict began in 1999 with the change of name from Irian Jaya to Papua and continued with the implementation of special autonomy for the Papua region (Rohim, 2015). Before efforts to approach the development method culminated in granting special autonomy and changing the name of Irian Jaya to Papua, efforts made by the government to deal with the separatist movement were carried out in ways that actually caused resistance, namely by carrying out military operations.

At least twelve military operations have been carried out by the TNI against OPM. These military operations include: 1) Operation Wisnumurti; 2) Conscious Operations; 3) Operation Bharatayuda; 4) Ultimate Operation; 5) Operation Koteka; 6) Smile Operation; 7) Operation Crow I; 8) Operation Crow II; 9) Operation Cassowary I; 10) Operation Cassowary II; 11) Operation Eagle I; and 12) Operation Rajawali II (Mishael et al., 2016). The series of military operations carried out by the Indonesian government left traces of human rights violations committed by the government against the people of Papua. Between 1963-1969 the victims of the Papuan people by military operations were estimated at 2,000-3,000 people, while Eliaser Bonay, the former Governor of Papua in 1981, once stated that the victims were around 30,000 people. Jan Warinussy, Executive Director of LP3BH Manokwari in 2006 estimated that there were nearly 100,000 victims since the Pepera 1969 – 2006 (Rahab, 2016).

The handling of the Papuan conflict against the OPM separatist movement through military operations is regrettable to many parties because this effort has sparked generations of violence and grudges from the Papuan people against the Indonesian government. Completion by means of a development approach and the granting of special autonomy for Papua also still does not alleviate the armed conflict in Papua. From January 2010 to February 2018, in Mukhtadi's research, it was stated that there were 69 cases of alleged extrajudicial killings committed by security forces in Papua with 85 deaths. The KKB also carried out a similar retaliatory action which resulted in security forces becoming victims (Mukhtadi, 2021).

The determination of KKB status as terrorists by the government triggered new problems in terms of material criminal law as well as formal criminal law. In material criminal law, the legal instrument that will be applied is no longer the Criminal Code, but changes to the Law on the Eradication of Terrorism. In terms of countermeasures, there are differences between political crimes such as treason and rebellion (separatism) and terrorism. The parties involved in countering separatism are the National Police and the TNI, which is carried out specifically when Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) occur, as has been done many times in the previous era. In their status as terrorists, the parties involved are the National Police, the TNI and the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).

In theory, according to Clark McCauly, there are two models in dealing with terrorism, namely the criminal justice model approach and the war model approach. In the criminal justice model approach, terrorism is seen as a form of violation of the law, so efforts to deal with it are carried out through law enforcement. The second approach, namely the war model views terrorists as a threat to the sovereignty of the State so that it places the use of military instruments in efforts to handle them (Fitri, 2018).

In Indonesia, based on Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010, the BNPT has the authority to develop and make policies and strategies as well as being the coordinator in the field of counter-terrorism. In terms of policy, the BNPT has three areas, namely prevention, protection and deradicalization; the field of enforcement and capacity building as well as the field of international cooperation. In carrying out its duties, the BNPT places more emphasis on efforts to counter terrorism that are integrative and comprehensive, namely by prioritizing a preventive approach (persuasive approach).

From the Police, there is a Special Detachment (Densus) 88 which is a special anti-terror unit with special competence to deal with various types and forms of terrorism. Within the TNI itself there are the TNI AD/Group 5 Anti-Terror Countermeasures (Dengultor), Detachment 81 Kopassus TNI AD, Detachment Jalamangkara (Denjaka) Marine Corps TNI AL, Detachment Bravo (Denbravo) TNI AU and BIN Anti-Terror Unit. State intelligence also plays a very important role in efforts to deal with terrorism in Indonesia, because with data and information sources from state intelligence, terrorist acts can be prevented or eradicated. (Sanur, 2016).

These institutions synergize with each other to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia not only by relying on the hard approach, namely by enforcing rules and enforcement agencies, but also by using a soft approach to the Indonesian people by preventing radicalist thoughts as the origin of the emergence of terrorist movements in Indonesia. Indonesia (Oktiana, 2018).

Judging from the form and actions carried out by the KKB so far, of course there will be over enforcement if law enforcement against perpetrators of violence and armed conflict in Papua must reduce all the power possessed by the government. Therefore, it would be too much for the government to assign terrorist status to the KKB because the scope of the crimes committed did not have a transnational aspect like terrorist groups that have so far disturbed the stability of Indonesia's national security.

Conclusion

The designation of the KKB in the armed conflict in Papua as a terrorist group is inappropriate because of the historical background of the violence perpetrated by the KKB, as well as the fulfillment of the elements contained in the Law on the Eradication of Terrorism. Even though the motive for what KKB did was political, the purpose of carrying out violence or threats of violence was not to create an atmosphere of terror or fear, but to break away from Indonesia, so that it would be more appropriate if KKB were perpetrators of political crimes as stipulated in Chapter I of Book Two Criminal Code.

Determining the terrorist status is not a solution to overcoming the conflict in Papua because the determination of the status does not only have consequences for the qualifications of the crimes committed, but also related to the model of law enforcement that was carried out against the KKB. If the KKB is declared a terrorist, then the criminal law instrument that applies is no longer the Criminal Code but the Law on the Eradication of Terrorism. In addition, the parties involved in handling the KKB are no longer the Police, the TNI, but more broadly, namely the BNPT, Polri, TNI and Intelligence.

In the context of national geostrategy, a persuasive approach must be taken by law enforcement officials as a form of protection for every citizen through alternative forms of dispute resolution, namely negotiation, mediation and arbitration, especially in Armed Criminal Groups, so as to create a sense of security and is a form of responsibility. and state justice for citizens.

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