Competition Integration Strategies and Irregular Wars to Support National Security

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Abstract

The development of irregular warfare and various phenomena of post-modern warfare increasingly make war strategies develop dynamically and adaptively. Strategy is no longer used as a tool to win wars like in the traditional era but is more directed towards how to maintain space security or security. In addition, threats are also growing rapidly and extraordinary in line with the rapid development of science and technology so that the study of strategy itself must also be adaptive and dynamic. This study uses a qualitative approach by using a literature study. The results of the study prove that to deal with this, the government needs to integrate between actors competing in irregular wars to support national security. The government must also take firm and bold steps to make 'peace' with non-state actors.

Keywords: *Competition; Defense Strategy; Irregular Warfare and National Security*

Introduction

The development of the strategic environment drags the world into an era where war becomes an irregular thing. An irregular war is a war in an unusual context where physical contact is sometimes no longer needed (Gray, 1999). this condition can be a threat to a country, especially to its national security. Thus, the present and future wars are very likely to shift from conventional wars (where the military is dealing with the military) to become unconventional/irregular.

As a result, threats to national defense are not exclusively posed by the military or by physical forces, but also by non-military and non-physical sources, some of which are not apparent to the human eye. Like military threats, ideological and/or political threats can take many forms. A country may face political dangers in the form of pressures to alter its political institutions' objectives, forms, or structures. This political threat is most extreme, mainly when the organizing principles of countries are antagonistic. What have Libya and Syria and radical Latin America and the Caribbean regimes done to some moderates of the Middle East (Leba and Jordan) and the Americas?? (Chile, Haiti, Guatemala, Cuba).

To put it another way, the political requirements associated with all bilateral and multilateral assistance can be viewed as political threats. Economic threat is a significant external threat. However, in comparison to external political and military threats, these external economic threats are more difficult to define precisely. Therefore, this national security threat cannot be said to directly affect the survival of the

state. Additionally, external economic threats are ambiguous and do not meet cross-border criteria while also failing to meet the criteria for the application of force.

Terrorism and radicalization, separatism and armed insurgency, natural disasters, border violations, piracy and resource theft, disease outbreaks, cyberattacks and espionage, as well as drug trafficking and abuse, are all actual threats (Regulation of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia Number 19 of 2015 concerning Policies for the Implementation of State Defense in 2015 – 2019). An unreal threat is a form of threat in the form of open conflict or conventional war, where what is faced is the strength of the armed forces of the two countries, currently and in the future the possibility is still slight against Indonesia. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) uses the term "irregular warfare" to refer to various military operations. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) coined the term to refer to one of four types of threats facing the US (irregular threats; the other three were traditional, disruptive, and catastrophic) and recommended that the US Department of Defense devote additional planning and funding to IW programs (US DoD, 2006) .

The two competitive priorities and irregular warfare are interconnected. In effect, the Joint Staff has renamed the Irregular Warfare and Competition Office. These new priorities have led to much attention being paid to the incapacity of common doctrine to tackle all wars. One issue stems from the conceptual constraints imposed by contemporary war doctrines definition of war as a violent conflict. The realities of the current competition, which often involves nonviolent means, are not addressed by that definition. This For example, takes unconventional warfare. It would be called violence to support the army component of a resistance movement, but opposition to a suppressive government in many ways can be crucial; support for the resistance movement that uses non-violent protest can also be decisive. For example, the mass movement that struck the Berlin Wall achieved much more than an armed conflict could ever have.

Irregular warfare is a conflict between state and non-state actors for control of the population and legitimacy. Though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, the IW prefers indirect and asymmetric approaches to eroding an adversary's power, influence, and will. It includes operations involving unconventional warfare (UW), stabilization, foreign internal defense (FID), counterterrorism (CT), and counterinsurgency (CI) (COIN). Military information support operations, cyberspace operations, countering threat networks, countering threat finance, civil-military operations, and security cooperation contribute to shaping the information environment and other arenas of competition and conflict centered on populations.

Within states, irregular warfare occurs across a broad spectrum of conflict, as illustrated by the graph below. This continuum of resistance encompasses nonviolent protest, illegal forms of protest, and escalating levels of violence ranging from rebellion to insurgency to full-scale belligerence. As an external actor, the United States can either use foreign internal defense, stabilization, counterinsurgency, or counterterrorism to quell unrest in a partner nation, or it can support resistance through unconventional warfare. Many of these may involve nonviolent measures, necessitating greater clarity in joint doctrine.


Figure 1: US Indo-Pacific Command Source (Burrel, 2021)

In the context of promoting national security, one can at least conceptualize Indonesia's national security by acquainting oneself with the doctrines and laws that underpin it. National security is the primary doctrine of national security. This study discusses how to integrate state and non-state actors who compete in irregular wars to support national security.

Theory

Irregular Warfare

An irregular warfare is one in which states and non-state entities engage in violent struggle over legitimacy and influence over a particular population or group without achieving military superiority or controlling geographical territory (Davis, 2008). Irregular warfare is primarily concerned with political conflicts that integrate both violent and non-violent components (Larson et al., 2009). As described as follows:


Figure 2: Conventional and irregular warfare (US DoD, 2007)

Irregular warfare is defined doctrinally in the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) as "a violent struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and control over relevant populations" (US DoD, 2010). Although the IW JOC version 2.0 omits the graphic depicted in Figure 2, it does advocate for a thorough understanding of the sociocultural environment: "The joint force must develop a thorough appreciation of the unique sociocultural, political, religious, economic, and military factors at play, as well as a detailed portrait of key segments of the population, including those with the greatest influence in the region" (US DoD, 2010). It continues, "To optimize its chances of success, the combined force must comprehend the people and operational environment, including the intricate historical, political, sociocultural, religious, economic, and other reasons of violent conflict" (US DoD, 2010). Additionally, "a range of techniques such as social network analysis, biometrics, and electronic mapping should be used consistently to build integrated databases as part of a continuous effort to acquire a complete knowledge that will guide planning and operations" (US DoD, 2010).

The IW JOC of 2007 started to restrict the list of activities considered IW. The distinctions between IW, stabilization, and major combat operations showed in Figure below drawn from the 2007 IW JOC (DoD, 2007). Five primary IW activities: UW, CT, FID, COIN and stability operations are identified as a 2010 version of the IW JOC. However, it recognizes several vital IW-related activities, including strategic communication, all types of information operations, PSYOPs, CMOs and legal assistance (DoD, 2010b). This risk once again extending the concept to the extent that it is no longer analytically useful.

Figure 3: Irregular Warfare, Major Combat Operations, and Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Joint Operating Concepts

As a result of this examination of existing IW doctrine, Unquestionably, IW involves US soldiers working with allies and foes in a violent fight for legitimacy, with indirect operations taking precedence over direct actions (although both may occur). However, this doctrinal definition of IW comes up short of describing the maritime positions in such operations. The Navy's Irregular Warfare Office defines IW as follows:

IW emphasizes the use of indirect, an emphasis on using indirect and unorthodox tactics to undermine, attrite, and exhaust an enemy, or to render him irrelevant, rather than outright defeating him through traditional military conflict (Mullins, undated).

National Security

Barry Buzan, a security expert, classifies security into five categories: military, political, environmental, economic, and social. Military strategy implies that there will be only one of them in the national security system. [See Barry Buzan's 1991 book, People, States, and Fears: A Post Cold War Agenda for International Security Studies. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers]. According to Born and Flupi (as cited by Prof. Banyu Perwita), in a democratic state system, there are three perspectives on security sector reform. To begin, security sector reform serves as a safeguard for domestic and international stability. Security and political instability, particularly in countries undergoing democratic transitions and in developing countries in general, are growing concerns concerning the SSR. Second, security sector reform will also help to improve the political-economic climate. Conflicts and domestic security threats frequently arise in developing countries due to foreign investors' entering the country. In that context, this reform also encourages the development of good governance. Third, increasing democratization and building harmonious civil-military relations and civil supremacy (Perwita, 2006).

According to the SSR concept, the effectiveness of the reform process is determined by whether a country has undergone democratization in its security system or not. The SSR demands the participation of various reformist forces (parliament, military and civilian) in promoting democratization by taking into account the objective conditions of the country's society, culture, politics and others (UK Department of International Development in (Perwita, 2006)).

According to Christopher S., "national security" in the United States of America (US) entails the following: "the protection of the United States from major threats to our territorial, political, or economic well-being". As also confirmed by the United States National Security Council Team who was presented by the Department of Defense at the event ..., it means that the US state uses the term "national" to mean a federation (USA), not "state" which means a state. Even for the US "national security" is the security of the world region that threatens the US state, while for domestic security they are developing "homeland security". Homeland security does not always imply national security. Homeland security entails a greater appreciation for the security of a country as a whole, rather than the sum total of all security concerns, namely the state's security and the security of life within a country.

In general, both of them struggle to mention the security coverage area (reference object of security) (Buzan, 1991). The conventional definition of security is that it is the security of a country that is endangered by the military force of another country and that must be preserved through the use of the country's own military strength (Mutimer, 2009). Under this approach, the state becomes both the subject and the target of attempts to protect national security interests. This group believes that all political and international phenomena are state-related. In this conventional view, the state is central to efforts to maintain state security (Prasetyono, 2006).

Defense Strategy

According to Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015 in Indonesian Defense White Paper stated that the national defense strategy is formulated in three basic substances, which include: 'what is defended, how to defend and with what to defend', which is described in the form of goals and objectives, how to achieve the targets and the resources used. Furthermore, according to Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015 in National Defense Doctrine, stated that the Indonesian nation's defence system is a universal defense system that entails mobilizing all components of the nation to participate in national defense. Therefore, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia concerning Policy for the Implementation of National Defense in 2015-2019, stated that national defense strategies must be proportionate, balanced, and coordinated in order to achieve a strong, effective, and high-defence state defense force and capability. If we mention the strategy to deal with irregular warfare, we will discuss some of them:

1. Ends is the strategy's objective: to maintain and protect the state's sovereignty, the Republic of Indonesia's territorial integrity, and the safety of all nations from attacks by non-state actors operating within the framework of irregular warfare. It will rebut what has been defended.

2. Means are national resources that are used to maintain and achieve the goals and objectives to be achieved. If referring to the prevailing laws and doctrines, to overcome irregular warfare, we use non-military defense or government agencies outside the defense sector as the primary element, while government agencies within the defense sector serve as supporting elements.

3. While Ways is how to use national resources to achieve goals or targets that are maintained, namely by planning, preparing, and implementing a state defense system that is strong and has high deterrence in the face of irregular warfare in accordance with the Indonesian people's understanding of peace and war.

Methodology

This study was conducted using a qualitative research method that seeks to understand a phenomenon experienced in a specific, natural context by the subject. The phenomenon is investigated by scientific methods, and then described with the right grammar so that others can understand it. (Moleong, 2013). The research carried out uses a qualitative descriptive approach in order to describe and describe scientific phenomena, based on characteristics and links between research objects. This qualitative descriptional study does not essentially provide any special treatment or manipulation of the studied variables, so that the results are described and explained according to the scientific evidence (Sukmadinata, 2011).

The primary data in this study were obtained through interviews and direct observation which were intended to obtain data in the form of facts and information directly from the research subjects. While the secondary data used were obtained through library research activities on several documents and literature relevant to the research topic (Arikunto, 2006). The analytics are based on three simultaneous streams of activities, namely: data reduction, data presentation, conclusion drawing / verification, according to Miles & Huberman (1992:16).

Discussion

The uncertain environmental situation in various countries during the pandemic is widely exploited by those who are "opposite" to the government to further their hidden agenda. In Indonesia, a similar phenomenon occurs. The presidential election feuds of 2014 and 2019 continue to leave deep wounds in a number of communities and groups. The methods of exploitation they employ during the pandemic serve a single purpose: to erode public trust in the government (Mileham, 2016). They attempt to bring down the government regime by piggybacking on a pandemic situation and creating situations that could trigger events such as demonstrations, rebellions, fights, and motions of no confidence.

As has been explained, the pandemic situation is widely used by non-state actors to win the hearts of the people by trying to reduce their trust in a legitimate government (Arquila, 2011). The seeds of division that they try to sow through the infodemic phenomenon, which works on the premise of perception is reality, are focused on a number of efforts to build perceptions among the public (Ballow, 2016).

Irregular warfare is a term that refers to the various forms of violence perpetrated by non-state actors, including terrorism and insurgency. Examples of form of warfare in which the distribution of troops between the warring parties are balanced only with limited and irregular military capabilities, such as lack of training, old weapons, or makeshift equipment. What distinguishes it from other forms of expression is... The focus of its operations—a relevant population—and its strategic objective—to obtain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of, that relevant population—are irregular. Irregular warfare is a warfare with the population as its primary objective necessitates a distinct mindset and set of capabilities from warfare with the objective of militarily defeating an adversary (Painter, 2007).

Irregular warfare is a conflict between state and non-state actors over population control and legitimacy. Irregular warfare prefers indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may make use of the full range of military and other capabilities to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. It encompasses the unconventional warfare (UW), stabilization, foreign internal defense (FID), counter-terrorism (CT), and counterinsurgency (CI) missions (COIN). Related activities such as military information support operations, cyberspace operations, countering threat networks, countering threat finance, civil-military operations, and security cooperation also shape the information environment and other arenas of competition and conflict centered on populations.

In Indonesia, this irregular war is more inclined to war on social media that seeks to lead public opinion to discredit the government. The goal, to eliminate trust in the government and create chaos.

Irregular Warfare and National Security

Issues of security and insecurity are not synonymous with mere physical or military threats. Paul Hoffman (2004) states that for hundreds of millions of people in the world today, one of the causes of their insecurity in life is not merely terrorism, but excessive poverty. Today, more than one billion people on earth (out of a total of six billion) live on just one dollar a day. According to research conducted by the Oslo Peace Research Institute and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2002), civil wars or internal conflicts within a country result in more deaths than armed conflicts between states and rebels or separatist movements. Compared to 1000 deaths per year for civil wars with 25 deaths per year for vertical conflicts between states and rebels or separatist movements. Among the indirect causes of civil wars are poverty, hunger, inequality in income distribution, and forced displacement.

Indeed, Indonesia's national security doctrine, based on the astagatra method, and Law Number 3 of 2002 on National Defense, have embraced a new security paradigm known as comprehensive security. Dewi F. Anwar (ISEAS, 2000) states: "…this concept is very similar to the doctrine of comprehensive security in its multidimensional approach to security. Security is not merely seen in military terms, but encompass a Towards a Comprehensive Security Paradigm with a Human Security Perspective in Indonesian National Security Policy Lex Journalica Vol. 6 No.1, December 2008 9 much wider spectrum, including economic, political, and social aspects…"

Thus, between Irregular warfare and national security, it can be concluded that the existence of this irregular warfare can disrupt national security in the long term.

Integration of Competition and Irregular War

The development of irregular warfare and various post-modern warfare phenomena increasingly makes strategies develop dynamically and adaptively. The point is that strategies are increasingly flexible in responding to and responding to various challenges that arise in each era. When entering the post-modern era, strategy is no longer used as a tool to win wars like in the traditional era but is more directed towards how to maintain space security or security.

In this post-modern era, threats and challenges are growing very rapidly and extraordinary in line with the rapid development of science and technology so that strategy studies themselves must also be adaptive and dynamic in responding to and responding to various kinds of threats and challenges that are growing day by day towards in a direction that sometimes we cannot accept and believe with common sense.

The government must take firm and bold steps to make 'peace' with non-state actors to deal with this.

Conclusion

Sovereign governments must take effective steps to deal with this irregular warfare phenomenon. No matter how small the seeds seen in the life of the state should not be ignored, because they will disturb national security and especially the sovereignty of a country. However, no matter how big the challenge, there should be no irregular warfare through the efforts of competing against various components of society in the NKRI.

The seeds of division caused by irregular warfare can be extinguished by focusing on both parties' aspects in common, state and non-state actors – not highlighting the differences. The government must be able to win the hearts of the people.

Some things to note are:

1. The integrity and sovereignty of the state must be in the common interest. Differences of opinion, no matter how big and loud, must be channeled constitutionally. Maturity in democracy must be instilled in the Indonesian people from an early age.

2. The understanding that Indonesia will be able to get out of the post-pandemic economic recession if all components of society unite must be instilled by all parties. The government must have the courage to listen and involve those who are at odds with it in various elegant ways. Communication lines in a democracy should not be closed, but should be opened as wide as possible so that the people can participate together in building the country.

3. The government and its political opponents must be aware of the common enemies they face, including: modern imperialism, religious fundamentalism, anti-democracy, narrow secularism, drug trafficking, terrorism, etc. Only by having a common enemy can all components of the nation that have been at war with each other be reunited.

4. Integrating the actors involved in irregular warfare, both state and non-state actors, is one way to resolve irregular warfare.

In the end, Indonesia must continue to ensure the preservation of democracy as an effective means of preventing and dealing with irregular warfare that can disrupt national security and state sovereignty.

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